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Abstract 
 We analyze comprehensive manufacturing firm data to measure the contribution of inter-
firm employment reallocation to aggregate productivity growth during the socialist and reform 
periods in six transition economies.  Modifying a standard decomposition technique to better 
reflect the role of firm entry, we find that reallocation rates and productivity contributions are 
very low under socialism, but they rise dramatically after reforms, and productivity contributions 
greatly exceed those observed in market economies.  Early in transition, more reform is 
associated with larger contributions from reallocation, but later, and on average over the whole 
transition, this relationship is reversed.  Though reallocation rates are larger in faster reforming 
economies, higher productivity dispersion in slower reformers creates higher productivity gains 
for a given volume of reallocation.  The results imply that reallocation should be viewed as 
necessary regular maintenance for a well-functioning economy, and particularly large 
productivity contributions tend to reflect previous neglect more than current virtue. 
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1.  Introduction 
Basic economics stresses the crucial role of resource allocation in achieving efficiency 
and implies as a corollary the importance of flexible reallocation in fostering economic growth.  
Until recently, however, data constraints have prevented empirical research from quantifying the 
magnitudes and contributions of reallocation.  Comprehensive panel data on business units are 
required, for example, to measure the extent to which aggregate productivity growth is driven by 
productivity improvements within firms as opposed to resource reallocation from less to more 
productive firms.  Research on these questions is still in its early stages, but some of it has 
already suggested substantial contributions of reallocation to aggregate productivity growth.1 
This paper extends research on reallocation and productivity in several ways:  data, 
methods, comparative analysis, and interpretation.  We study a set of formerly socialist 
economies that have been engaged in the transition from central planning for more than a decade, 
countries that have not received a great deal of attention but that we argue provide particularly 
interesting cases for investigating reallocation.  We assemble comparable annual panel data with 
long time series on the universe (or near-universe) of manufacturing firms in six of these 
economies—Georgia, Hungary, Lithuania, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine—and we apply the 
same data-cleaning and statistical procedures to each of them, in order to obtain genuinely 
comparable results.  Following previous studies of productivity-enhancing reallocation, our 
measurement approach relies on decompositions of aggregate productivity growth (particularly 
those of Haltiwanger, 1997, and Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan, 2001); we propose a modified 
method that we argue better reflects the contribution from entry. 
Why do some economies achieve more productivity growth via reallocation of resources 
from lower- to higher-valued uses?  Many previous studies maintain, implicitly or explicitly, that 
higher contributions of reallocation to productivity growth result from better policy and business 
environments with lower costs of adjustment.  While earlier research has usually focused on 
single economies in a narrow window of time, a logical next step is to use comparable microdata 
from different economic policy contexts to understand how these factors affect the pace and 
contributions of reallocation.2 
Exploiting the cross-country and time series dimensions of our data, we carry out a 
comparative analysis of reallocation and productivity across an extraordinary variety of policy 
settings. By all accounts, the socialist economies had poor innovation incentives and selection 
mechanisms, suggesting much weaker processes of creative destruction under central planning 
than in well-functioning market economies.  The collapse of Communist rule and subsequent 
liberalization (in the early to mid-1990s) opened up opportunities for rapid restructuring to 
                                                 
1 See, for instance, Baily, Hulten, and Campbell (1992) and Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2001) for the U.S.; 
Griliches and Regev (1995) for Israel; Liu and Tybout (1996) for Chile and Columbia; Aw, Chen, and Roberts 
(2001) for Taiwan; Disney, Haskel, and Heden (2003) for the UK; and Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta 
(2004) and Brown and Earle (2002, 2006) for a few transition economies. 
2 Developing such data for multiple countries is even much more difficult than for a single economy.  Moreover, 
variations in data (collection methods, coverage, frequency, and definitions), in cleaning procedures (particularly the 
construction of longitudinal links), and in decomposition methodologies can make comparisons difficult if not 
impossible.  But our data are quite similar and we apply consistent methods of data preparation and analysis to the 
six countries.  Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta (2004) study the results produced by other researchers using a 
common program for several countries in the early to mid-1990s.  Aw, Chung, and Roberts (2003) compare 
productivity and turnover patterns in Taiwan and Korea in the 1980s, but they do not measure the productivity 
growth attributable to reallocation.  Pavcnik (2002) and Eslava, et al. (2004) are before- and-after studies of the 
effects of reforms in single countries (Chile and Colombia, respectively). 
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address the accumulated patterns of misallocation.  The six economies we study adopted 
different speeds of policy reforms and therefore may exhibit different responses in this early 
transition period as well as in the later transition, when the economies stabilized and growth 
resumed (particularly after 2000).  Our data enable comparisons of the pace and productivity 
contributions of reallocation across these varied settings, as well as with the findings for other 
economies that are available from previous research.  To help account for the variation in the 
size of productivity contributions, we propose and implement a method to decompose the 
differences into three components:  the dispersion of productivity, the pace of reallocation, and 
the correlation between reallocation and relative productivity across firms. 
We find that the reallocation rates and contributions to aggregate productivity growth are 
quite different in our data from the results that have been reported for other countries.  They are 
different during the central planning years in that both the pace and contributions of reallocation 
in the economies we study are much lower than elsewhere.  They are different after economic 
liberalization in that the contributions of reallocation to productivity growth become much higher 
than elsewhere.  The pace of reallocation also rises quickly after reforms, but only to the levels 
of developed market economies (except for Hungary in the early 1990s and Georgia in the early 
2000s, when it is much higher); in general, therefore, transition economies achieve larger 
productivity gains for roughly the same reallocation rates.  Despite this anomaly, the results 
demonstrate both the small role of reallocation under central planning and the very effective 
creative destruction unleashed by economic liberalization.  In this sense, our analysis strongly 
supports the conclusions of previous research on the productivity contributions of reallocation. 
However, the magnitudes of these contributions differ considerably across the six 
economies we study.  In Hungary, generally considered the fastest reformer among the six in our 
sample (and among the fastest of all transition economies), the reallocation contribution rises 
earlier than elsewhere and it reaches levels much higher than comparable figures for Western 
economies, but then it peaks quickly and declines to close to zero.  Lagging reformers realize 
significant reallocation contributions more slowly, but when the contributions emerge they 
become still much higher than in Hungary or the West, and they persist through recent data.  
Contrary to conventional wisdom, the rank order across countries in the size of contributions of 
reallocation to productivity growth in recent periods as well as over the whole transition is 
inversely correlated with reform speed. 
Our decomposition of the cross-country and over-time differences sheds light on these 
patterns.  Reallocation led to no productivity growth in the centrally planned economies not only 
because so little reallocation occurred, but also because of a very low correlation between 
reallocation and relative productivity at the firm level, particularly in Soviet Russia:  the 
direction of resource reallocation had little relationship with relative productivities.  The rise in 
productivity-enhancing reallocation during the transition is proportionately greater than the rise 
in the pace of reallocation because of simultaneous rises in the dispersion of productivity and the 
correlation between reallocation and relative productivity. 
Comparing across countries, we show that the increase in productivity dispersion was 
larger in the slower reforming economies, a result we interpret as reflecting less cleansing of low 
productivity firms in the early transition period.  Meanwhile, the faster reformers have had much 
better within-firm productivity growth, facilitated by the weeding out of worse performers, the 
encouragement of experimentation from new entrants, and the enhanced competitive pressure on 
surviving incumbents.  The two main components of productivity growth—within-firm and 
reallocation—thus tend to be negatively correlated in a cross-section of countries. 
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Somewhat paradoxically, therefore, we find that reallocation matters most when it 
appears to matter least, in terms of direct productivity contributions.  Fast reformers experience 
an initial boost of productivity growth due to reallocation just after liberalization, but within a 
few years the contribution is negligible.  Slow reformers permit the productivity distribution to 
widen so much that reallocation contributions become large later on.  These findings support a 
more nuanced view of the role of reallocation in which indirect effects of market pressures may 
be more important than the direct contributions of reallocation to productivity growth. 
While these results may be surprising to some observers, we argue that they can be 
interpreted using standard models of industry dynamics.  To take one example, costs of entry in 
these models have implications for firm turnover rates and the productivity cut-off level for 
exiting firms.  Lower entry costs imply lower productivity levels of entrants relative to 
incumbents and higher productivity levels of exiting firms.  Thus, if entry costs are negatively 
associated with the quality of the business and policy environment, then a better environment 
may produce smaller direct contributions of reallocation to aggregate productivity growth.  The 
initial burst of high contributions in fast reforming economies reflects the accumulated 
misallocations of socialism, and the subsequent decline in contributions reflects an improved, not 
a worsened business environment.  The later but still larger contributions in the slower reformers 
result from a widening of productivity gaps that reflect the accumulation of missed opportunities 
for reallocation, thus representing past neglect more than current virtue. 
The rest of the paper proceeds with a brief discussion of relevant models of industry 
dynamics, central planning, and the different economic reform programs adopted in the six 
countries in Section 2.  Section 3 discusses the data and methods for measuring productivity and 
decomposing productivity growth.  Section 4 contains the results of our measurement of the 
magnitude of reallocation and its contribution to productivity growth.  We also analyze the 
extent to which differences in the contribution of reallocation to productivity growth across time 
and countries are associated with the underlying factors of reallocation volume, productivity 
dispersion, and correlation between reallocation and productivity differentials.  Section 5 
contains a brief conclusion. 
2. Conceptual Framework 
Our approach to analyzing reallocation and productivity is motivated by standard theories 
of industry dynamics with heterogeneous firms (e.g., Jovanovic, 1982; Hopenhayn, 1992; 
Hopenhayn and Rogerson, 1993; Ericson and Pakes, 1995).  The key elements in these theories 
are costs of adjustment (entry, exit, investment, and factor changes), as well as uncertainty about 
the future evolution of productivity.  A basic result from the theories is that firm turnover and 
reallocation occur even in stationary equilibrium.  Of course, the data we are examining can 
hardly be considered as drawn from equilibrium environments, but the theories are nonetheless 
useful for understanding the association between productivity differences and firm dynamics and 
therefore reallocation-enhancing productivity. 
Combining the models into a single framework for simplicity, let us assume that profit-
maximizing firms in a competitive industry have heterogeneous productivity given by q = q(k, l; 
φ, α), where q is a homogeneous output, k is capital services, l is labor services, φ is an 
idiosyncratic disturbance, and α is an adjustment cost for changes in factor utilization.  In the 
Jovanovic (1982) model, φ represents a signal of true productivity, about which firms gradually 
learn, while in Hopenhayn (1992), φ is a firm-specific shock with the distribution function 
F(φt+1|φt) strictly decreasing in φt, so that future productivity tends to be increasing in current 
productivity.  Entering firms pay sunk cost Ce and receive an initial productivity draw from G(φ).  
 4
Incumbents may choose to exit, paying Cx, which includes transaction costs of shutdown (e.g., 
bankruptcy proceedings) and benefits in the form of savings on fixed operating costs and 
realizations of scrap values for capital and outside opportunities of other factors.  With the 
addition of an investment possibility, as in Ericson and Pakes (1995), a firm may try to improve 
its productivity by incurring cost CI to obtain a new distribution of productivity outcomes F’ that 
stochastically dominates F.  Finally, changes in factors Δk and Δl incur an adjustment cost α(Δk, 
Δl), which reduces current period output (Hopenhayn and Rogerson, 1993).3 
These assumptions yield predictions for relative productivity levels:  both entrants and 
exiting firms should have lower average productivity than survivors.  They also have 
implications for the pace of reallocation among continuing firms and through firm turnover 
(entry and exit), for the cutoff level of productivity for firms to continue operating, φ*, and for 
the effects of changes in costs on reallocation and productivity differentials.  Increases in Ce and 
Cx tend to reduce entry, exit, φ*, and the mean φ of surviving firms.  An increase in CI reduces 
productivity growth and reallocation, as firms are less likely to undertake investments that raise 
in expected productivity and growth relative to noninvestors.  An increase in α raises exit but 
reduces reallocation and productivity of survivors.  Increases in the noisiness of productivity 
signals, expanding the variance of F, raise the value of staying in the market and reduce φ*, exit, 
and the mean φ of surviving firms. 
While the theoretical models contain a number of unrealistic assumptions—profit 
maximization, perfect competition, and homogeneous output, in addition to stationary 
equilibrium—we can use their basic insights to inform our analysis of the contributions of 
reallocation to productivity growth.  Because lower Ce tends to reduce the relative productivity 
of entrants, it decreases the contribution of entry.  Lower Cx (higher fixed cost of operating) 
raises φ* and the relative productivity of exiting firms and therefore tends to decrease the 
contribution of exit.  Lower α makes factor adjustments cheaper, implying that firms are likely to 
engage in more frequent but smaller changes that each result in a smaller productivity gain, thus 
a lower contribution to aggregate productivity growth.  Lower CI extends downward the upper 
tail of the firm distribution that invest and grow, resulting in an average lower productivity in the 
growing segment and a lower contribution of between firm reallocation.  Lower uncertainty 
reinforces each of these relationships as it makes firms less reluctant to incur the corresponding 
sunk costs (of entry, exit, investment, or factor changes), because the adjustment is less likely to 
be reversed and is therefore more likely to take place. 
These insights can be usefully applied in the empirical settings we are studying.  
Concerning the socialist period, most business decisions were tightly regulated if not directly 
controlled.4  Enterprises had strong incentives to meet output targets but little incentive to 
contain costs or innovate.  There was no effective competition from other domestic producers or 
from imports.  Worker mobility was restricted, the enterprise-level wage bill was tightly 
controlled, and layoffs were difficult and rare.5  Effectively, all the adjustment costs would be 
extremely high, with Ce and Cx both close to infinite from the firm’s point of view. 
                                                 
3 The precise form of these adjustment costs (convex, linear, lumpy) is not the essential issue here, but see the 
discussion of cost structure in Hamermesh and Pfann (1996). 
4 See Kornai (1992) and Gregory and Stuart (1997) for comprehensive overviews of the socialist system and early 
reforms.  The term “centrally planned” is a standard label, but it is a partial misnomer.  Planning generally involved 
aggregates at the industry (“branch”) level, and most economic decisions at the firm level were not dictated from 
above but by bargaining between the firm and its supervising branch ministry. 
5 For a discussion of labor allocation in the Soviet Union, see Granick (1987).  Gregory and Collier (1988) discuss 
Soviet unemployment, which, like layoffs, appears to have been very low, but not zero. 
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Conceivably, omnipotent and omniscient planners might have tried to allocate resources 
to fulfill the plan’s output and efficiency goals.  But planning and implementation could also be 
influenced by political objectives, among them rapid industrialization and large, prestigious 
projects.  Moreover, even the most efficiency-minded planners faced difficulties controlling all 
the enterprises in the economy.  The greatest obstacle was posed by a lack of reliable 
information, which arose from inherent features of the system: fixed prices, ratchet effects, and 
other incentives that discouraged innovation and information revelation about productive 
capacities.  Thus, while it seems unlikely that the planners would have been very successful in 
resource allocation and reallocation, how the system actually performed is an empirical 
question—a very interesting one that we can address with our data. 
The question is still more interesting in light of the variation in partial reforms adopted in 
the late socialist period.  In Romania, no liberalization occurred until the Ceaucescus were 
overthrown at the end of 1989.  By contrast, Hungary experienced a partial, gradual relaxation of 
the planning regime for the previous two decades under the rubric of “goulash communism,” and 
decentralization of many economic decisions to the enterprise level accelerated from the mid-
1980s.  Effectively, these reforms would have reduced costs of entry, exit, investment, and factor 
adjustment.  The Soviet Union began perestroika reforms in late 1988, although these were much 
more tentative than the earlier ones in Hungary.  Our data permit some analysis of the effects of 
these differences, particularly involving Hungary and Soviet Russia, on the pace of reallocation 
and its consequences for productivity growth. 
The adoption of wide-ranging reforms during the transition period (from about 1990) led 
to reductions in all types of adjustment costs, and the factors affecting reallocation and 
productivity begin to resemble those in market economies.  Liberalization of prices, entry, exit, 
imports, and employment together with privatization may increase incentives for productive 
reallocation through improved corporate governance and competition.  Nevertheless, the size of 
adjustment costs is a function of factors such as the macroeconomic and business environment, 
and observers have frequently suggested that, despite rapid liberalization, continued government 
intervention during the transition may stifle reallocation.  Direct subsidization and other forms of 
support for weak and failing enterprises (soft budget constraints) may reduce fixed operating 
costs and impede exit, while discriminatory taxes, bureaucratic interference, poor contract 
enforcement, and uncertain property rights protection may raise entry and investment costs, thus 
hindering entrepreneurship and growth of more successful firms (e.g., Frye and Shleifer, 1997; 
Åslund, Boone, and Johnson, 1996).  The transition economies could be subject to “sclerosis” 
(Caballero and Hammour, 1996), in which less productive matches fail to dissolve due to market 
imperfections and government policies, while the creation of more productive matches of 
resources and enterprises is impeded. 
The six countries we study in this paper cover the spectrum of transition policy strategies, 
at least as conventionally measured in evaluations of “progress” in reform and transition by 
international organizations such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD) and the World Bank.  The World Bank’s (1996) four-group classification of 26 
transition economies, for example, puts Hungary in the first group of leading reformers, 
Lithuania and Romania in the second group, Georgia and Russia in the third, and Ukraine in the 
fourth.  Similarly, the EBRD’s annual indicators of “progress in transition” invariably place 
Hungary at or close to the top of all transition economies; its average score across the price 
liberalization, foreign exchange and trade liberalization, small-scale privatization, large-scale 
privatization, enterprise reform, competition policy, banking sector reform, and non-banking 
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sector financial institutions indicators has been the highest or close to it among all transition 
economies since 1994.  The other countries started their major reforms later, implemented them 
more gradually, and have still not bridged the gap with Hungary.  Georgia and Ukraine started 
most slowly, but they rapidly converged with Romania and Russia in the late 1990s.6 
Regardless of the exact figures, which are certainly subject to measurement errors and 
disputes, the clear policy differences in the six countries suggest an interesting set of 
comparative hypotheses.  During the socialist period, Hungary’s partial reforms may have 
stimulated a somewhat faster paced and more effective productivity-enhancing reallocation 
compared to Soviet Russia.  During the transition, if more effective reforms stimulate 
productivity-enhancing reallocation, then Hungary’s ambitious policy should be reflected in the 
fastest increase in the contribution of reallocation to productivity growth.7  Although productive 
reallocation may be slowest to emerge in Georgia, Russia, and Ukraine, it should converge with 
that in Romania and Lithuania by the early 2000s. On the other hand, an alternative possibility 
suggested by the models of industry dynamics is that a reduction in adjustment costs may lead, at 
least over some range, to reduced contributions of reallocation to productivity growth.  Lower 
costs of entry, for instance, will tend to lower the average productivity of entrants and raise the 
average of exiting firms relative to survivors, reducing the contributions to firm turnover.  And 
lower costs of factor adjustment may lead to quicker responses that prevent large productivity 
gaps from developing.  More generally, low adjustment costs may lead to low productivity 
dispersion, leaving little scope for reallocation to contribute to productivity growth.  On the other 
hand, following liberalization, there may be an initial burst of productivity-enhancing 
reallocation, followed by a later period with relatively small direct contributions. Our empirical 
analysis provides evidence on these hypotheses. 
3. Data and Basic Methods 
3.1  Sources, Samples, and Variables 
The paper uses annual census-type data for manufacturing firms in each of the six 
countries.  Though the data sources and variables are similar, we have taken steps to make them 
sufficiently comparable to justify cross-country comparisons.    
The basic sources for the Hungarian and Romanian data are balance sheets and income 
statements associated with tax reporting:  to the National Tax Authority in Hungary and the 
Ministry of Finance in Romania.  All legal entities engaged in double-sided bookkeeping report, 
with the exception of Hungary before 1992—when only a sample consisting of all firms with at 
least 20 employees and some smaller firms is available.  The Romanian data are supplemented 
by the National Institute for Statistics’ enterprise registry and the State Ownership Fund’s 
portfolio and transactions data.  The Hungarian data are annual from 1986 to 2005, and the 
Romanian data from 1992 to 2006.  The sum of employment across all firms in the database is 
similar to the statistical yearbook number in both countries. 
The other four countries are former Soviet Republics.  Their data come from their 
national statistical offices, the descendants of the former State Statistical Committee 
                                                 
6 Success in macroeconomic stabilization followed a similar pattern, with Hungary experiencing the smallest 
cumulative output decline before recovering (15 percent), followed by Romania (21 percent), Russia (40 percent), 
Lithuania (44 percent), Ukraine (59 percent), and Georgia (78 percent).  Hungary never experienced annual inflation 
over 35 percent, while the other countries’ inflation rates exceeded 100 percent in some years, and Georgia, Russia, 
and Ukraine’s rates did not fall below that level until 1996 (World Bank, 2002). 
7 Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta (2004) suggest that the reallocation contribution to productivity growth is 
larger in transition countries implementing more institutional reform.  
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(Goskomstat), and therefore tend to be quite similar to one another.  The Georgian and 
Lithuanian data cover most firms outside the budgetary and financial sectors in 1995-2005 
(Lithuania) or 2000-2004 (Georgia).  The Georgian and Lithuanian databases include roughly 
three-fourths of total manufacturing employment reported in the yearbooks.  We also use data 
from the 1989 Soviet industrial registry to get a measure of pre-transition productivity dispersion 
in the two republics.  Unfortunately, we are unable to link these data with the later years, since 
our more recent data do not contain firm names or locations. 
The main sources in Russia and Ukraine are industrial enterprise registries from their 
national statistical offices, supplemented by balance sheet data.8  The data span 1985-2004 for 
Russia, and 1989 and 1992-2006 for Ukraine.  The Russian registries are supposed to include all 
industrial firms with over 100 employees as well as those that are more than 25 percent owned 
by the state and/or legal entities that are themselves included in the registry.  In practice, it 
appears that once firms enter the registries, they continue to report even if these conditions no 
longer hold.  The Russian data can therefore be taken as corresponding primarily to the “old” 
firm sector (and their successors) inherited from the Soviet period.  The 1992-1996 Ukrainian 
registries contain all industrial firms producing at least one unit of output, where a unit is defined 
differently depending on the product.  All legal entities outside the budgetary and financial 
sectors are included in the 1997-2006 registries. The pre-1992 Russian and 1989 Ukrainian data 
do not include firms in the military-industrial complex.  The Ukrainian coverage is fairly 
complete except in 1989 (69 percent of employment).  The Russian data cover nearly all activity 
through 1994; then the coverage declines to about 75 percent in more recent years as the de novo 
sector has grown. 
Some truncation was necessary to make the samples comparable across countries.  The 
data in all countries are limited to manufacturing (NACE 15-36).  We exclude the tobacco 
industry (NACE 16) due to insufficient observations in four of the six countries and the recycling 
industry (NACE 37) because of noncomparability with the classification system used until 
recently in Russia and Ukraine.  We also remove observations on variables showing highly 
volatile fluctuations according to any of the following criteria:  increase/decline by a factor 
greater than 5 in one year then decline/increase by a factor greater than 5 in the next year, change 
by a factor greater than 10 in the year after entry, or change by a factor of 10 in the final year of 
observation.9 
Following the previous literature on productivity growth decompositions, we analyze 
reallocation and productivity within industries, avoiding problems of comparisons across 
industries with very different technologies.  Ideally one would prefer to use industries 
disaggregated to the level of product markets, so as to compare firms only to their competitors.  
On the other hand, since the productivity decompositions rely on deviations from the industry 
average, it is important to have sufficient numbers of firms in each sector to ensure reliable 
estimates.  We have compromised by dividing manufacturing into 19 sectors, which are 2-digit 
NACE industries (except that 23 and 24 are combined, as are 30 and 32).   
                                                 
8 The units of observation in these data are firms, except for multi-plant entities where individual plants are listed as 
“subsidiaries” (dochernye predpriyatiya or “daughter companies”) in the Russian registries.  Apparently most but 
not all cases of multiple plants are treated individually in Russia:  the 1993 registry contains a variable indicating the 
number of plants, which equals 1 in 99.91 percent of the 18,121 nonmissing cases.  To avoid double-counting, we 
have dropped the consolidated records of entities with subsidiaries from the analysis. 
9 Outliers defined on the basis of labor and output are excluded from labor productivity calculations and those 
defined on the basis of capital as well are excluded from multifactor productivity exercises. Excluded observations 
constitute about 1 percent of the labor productivity sample and about 2 percent of the MFP sample.   
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These data have been extensively cleaned to remove inconsistencies and to improve 
missing longitudinal linkages due to change of firm identifier from one year to the next 
(associated with reorganizations and changes of legal form, for instance).  The inconsistencies 
were evaluated using information from multiple sources (including not only separate data 
providers, but also previous year information available in Romanian balance sheets and Russian 
and Ukrainian registries). The longitudinal linkages were improved using all available 
information, including industry, region, size, multiple sources for the same financial variables, 
and some exact linking variables (e.g., firm names and addresses in all countries except Georgia, 
Hungary, and Lithuania, where this information was not available) to match firms that exited the 
data in a given year with those that entered in the following year.  For Hungary we also used a 
database with direct information on longitudinal linkages:  if a firm changed its identification 
number for some reason (and it appeared in the data as a new entry or an exit), the database 
indicated whether it had a predecessor or successor and, if so, that firm’s identification number. 
To eliminate spurious exit and entry, we eliminated employment changes associated with 
disappearances followed by reappearances, as well as firm-years with more than 1,000 
employees in the year of entry or exit.  In Russia and Ukraine we also excluded firms in regions 
that are completely missing in the data in one of the two adjacent years, and those in industries 
with implausibly high entry or exit rates in that year (suggesting a change in sample coverage). 10  
Entry and exit associated with firms that were members of Soviet-era production associations or 
that belong to multi-establishment firms were also excluded in Russia.11 
Summary statistics and definitions for employment, output, and capital stock are reported 
for the first and last years in each country’s data in Table 1.  Average employment significantly 
declines everywhere except Georgia.12  The particularly sharp declines in Hungary, Romania, 
and Ukraine can be explained by high rates of small firm entry after liberalization.13 
3.2  Productivity Measures and Decompositions 
We compute two types of firm-level productivity measures:  labor productivity (LP) is 
calculated as the log of gross output or sales divided by number of employees, and multifactor 
productivity (MFP) is the residual from an industry-specific Cobb-Douglas production function 
of gross output (or sales) in capital and labor (using 19 manufacturing sectors).  Both of these 
measures have been used in previous studies of reallocation-enhancing productivity.  Because 
they do not distinguish firm-level quantity and price variation, which are unavailable in the data, 
they also conflate technical efficiency and firm-specific price variation, thus representing 
revenue productivity.14  For our purposes, this is not necessarily a disadvantage, particularly if 
                                                 
10 The size-related exclusions amount to no more than 0.3 percent of the sample in any country.  The changes in 
industry and regional coverage result in the exclusion of about 2 percent of observations in Russia and Ukraine. 
11 The reason for excluding production association entry and exit during the Soviet period and multi-establishment 
firm entry and exit during the transition period is that many of these firms report inconsistently in the data.  In one 
year a consolidated entity may appear, in the next each of the establishments may report separately, or vice versa.  
These exclusion rules result in a conservative bias.  Of course some production associations may be starting new 
establishments or closing others down, and there may be some true entry and exit in industries with implausibly high 
rates and in regions that enter and exit the dataset.  
12 The Georgian data start only in 2000, and therefore do not exhibit a sharp decline.  Georgia’s average 
manufacturing employment in 1989 is 302. 
13 Average employment and output decline among old firms (enterprises inherited from the socialist system) samples 
as well, but the Hungarian, Romanian, and Ukrainian declines are much smaller than in the full samples.  
14 See Eslava et al. (2004) and Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2008) for analyses of firm-specific revenue and 
physical productivity. 
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variation in firm-specific prices reflects quality differences.  Moreover, if revenue productivity 
has lower dispersion than physical productivity (as found by Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson, 
2008, for some U.S. industries), then our calculations of the productivity consequences of 
reallocation would be still larger if measured for physical productivity. 
In each case, the productivity values are aggregated into a constructed productivity index 
for each year and industry, and then the aggregates are decomposed using methods that have 
become standard in the literature.  We then further decompose the effect of reallocation on 
productivity growth into productivity dispersion, reallocation volume, and the correlation 
between reallocation and productivity differentials (described in detail in Section 4.3).  It bears 
emphasis that the decomposition approach allows an examination only of direct contributions of 
reallocation to productivity growth, ignoring any indirect effects, for example entrants as a 
source of market pressures on incumbents.  
The method of decomposing aggregate productivity growth employed here is a modified 
version of the proposal of Haltiwanger (1997) and Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2001), 
hereafter referred to as FHK.  Construction of aggregate labor productivity measures involves 





itt PSSP      (1) 
where Pt is aggregate productivity in year t, Sit is the employment share of industry/sector i in 
year t, Seit is the employment share of firm e in industry i and year t, and Peit is the productivity 
of enterprise e in sector i in year t. 
FHK’s “method I” decomposition expresses the change in aggregate sectoral productivity 
over a period of length k (thus from year t-k to year t), ΔPit (where ∑=
e
eiteitit PSP ), as follows: 


















etketit PpsPpsspsPppsP . (2) 
The first term in (2) measures the average change in firm productivity holding composition 
constant at its base year (t-k) structure, in order to distinguish average productivity growth from 
composition effects.  This term may reflect firm restructuring and deterioration as well as 
mismeasured price and quality changes.  The second term measures the between-firm (within-
sector) reallocation effect, the covariance of share changes with the base year deviation of 
enterprise productivity from the industry mean.  The third term measures the intrasectoral 
covariance of productivity and compositional changes, the “cross” effect, while the fourth and 
fifth represent the contributions of entry (N) and exit (X), respectively.15  The fourth and fifth 
                                                 
15 We have also examined an FHK method using average period weights, which has the advantage of being more 
robust to measurement error but provides a less intuitive way to measure reallocation contributions; in any case, the 
results from that analysis produce similar qualitative conclusions.  But we do not use the Olley and Pakes (1996) 
cross-sectional decomposition (OP) of aggregate productivity into unweighted average productivity and covariance 
of deviations of employment shares and productivity from sector means.  The OP approach may attribute some 
activities to within effects that the FHK decompositions treat as reallocation effects and vice versa.  If two firms 
with fixed shares switch positions in the productivity distribution, OP reports a reallocation effect and FHK a 
within-firm effect from the change.  When a firm above average in both size and productivity splits into two firms 
with the same productivity as the parent but below average size, this appears as a positive within effect and a 
negative reallocation effect with OP, but it has no effect on either the within effect or the reallocation effect in the 
FHK decompositions (the exit and entry terms cancel).  OP treats exit of a firm below average in size and 
productivity as a positive within-firm and negative reallocation effect, while FHK treats the exit as a positive 
reallocation effect.  In our view, the FHK accords more closely with intuition about reallocation. 
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terms combined are the net entry effect.  We calculate the total reallocation contribution as the 
sum of the between and net entry effects.16  
 Notice, however, that the FHK net entry effect is not purely a reallocation effect.  For 
instance, if exiting firms are just as productive on average as stayers in the initial period, and 
entrants are also equally productive as surviving incumbents in the final period, then the FHK net 
entry effect will simply be the entry share of activity multiplied by the change in sectoral 
productivity, i.e., its productivity growth contribution will be proportionate to its share of 
activity.  Merely by mimicking incumbents, entrants may be credited with contributions to 
productivity growth, which is not a natural way to reckon such contributions.  In a period of 
more rapid growth, this proportionate component will be larger, in a period of decline it will be 
negative, and in absolute value it will be larger the longer is k.  Thus, even if entrants are 
identical to incumbents, the calculated contribution of entry will fluctuate with incumbent 
growth rates, and the extent of this covariation will vary with the period length under analysis. 
An alternative approach is to compare entrants with incumbent productivity in year t and 
measure the contribution of net entry relative to a benchmark in which exitors are like 
incumbents in the exit year and entrants are like incumbents in the entry year.  This can be 
accomplished by decomposing FHK’s entry term as follows: 




itetetkititetkitetet PpsPPsPps .      (3) 
The first term is the change in average sector productivity over the period, weighted by entrants’ 
share, which may be labeled the “proportionate entry” term.  The second term is the weighted 
average of entrants’ productivity compared to the sector average in year t, the “disproportionate 
entry” term.17  The entire decomposition becomes: 





















kitketet Pps 1 .          (4) 
The combination of exit and disproportionate entry show whether firm turnover contributes 
disproportionately to aggregate productivity growth.  For comparison purposes, the FHK entry 
term can be recovered by simply adding the two entry terms in (4) together.  
 Besides providing a more natural measure of the entry contribution, the equation (4) 
decomposition also has the advantage of shifting any measurement error in firm turnover into the 
proportionate entry term.  If longitudinal links in the data are randomly broken so that some 
average-productivity continuers are counted as exits and subsequent entrants, for example, their 
relative productivity would contribute to the FHK entry term.  In our modified decomposition, 
random breaks of firm linkages are incorporated into the proportionate entry term, but do not 
affect the exit and disproportionate entry terms.  Moreover, since productivity of entering firms 
is compared with incumbents’ productivity in the same year, the disproportionate entry term is 
not sensitive to mismeasured price deflators.18 
                                                 
16 The cross term could partly be thought of as a reallocation contribution as well, though it is ambiguous how much 
of it is reallocation versus a within-firm effect. 
17 We thank John Haltiwanger for suggesting this terminology. 
18 Although they do not calculate the contribution of disproportionate entry as we do, Foster, Haltiwanger, and 
Krizan (2001) and Disney, Haskel, and Heden (2003) implicitly adopt the same perspective when they run 
regressions comparing the productivity of entrants in the final year to the productivity levels of exitors in the initial 
year and continuers in the initial and final years. 
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4.  Results 
4.1  The Pace of Reallocation under Socialism and in Transition 
Before presenting the reallocation contribution decomposition results, we first report 
calculations of annual job reallocation measures following standard definitions (Davis and 
Haltiwanger, 1992; see also Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson, 1989).  Figure 1 shows job 
creation, job destruction, job reallocation, and intra-industry excess job reallocation, and 
Appendix Table 1 contains the underlying data for these series plus the shares of entry and exit 
firm employment in total employment.  Job creation and destruction among continuing firms can 
be calculated by subtracting these shares from total job creation and destruction, respectively.  
The net change is negative in the early transition years in all countries, reflecting the sharp 
decline in the manufacturing sector during that period. 
The pace of gross job flows under central planning, evidenced by the results from 
Hungary and Russia, are well below those typically found in market economies (which are 
typically 8-10 percent each for annual creation and destruction).  However, the job flow rates 
during this period are significantly larger in Hungary than Russia because of both higher creation 
and destruction among continuing firms and more firm turnover.  Even though Hungary 
experiences only a modest amount of firm turnover prior to the transition, the Russian data show 
virtually none.  These patterns may reflect greater pre-transition reform in Hungary.  Once the 
transition starts, there is a marked increase in job flows both from continuing firms and firm 
turnover.  The increase is much larger in Hungary, which implemented faster reform.   
Georgia experiences the largest creation and destruction rates on average during the 
transition.19  The rates in Hungary, Lithuania, and Romania are also quite high.  Russia and 
Ukraine experience significantly less reallocation both from continuers and firm turnover.  The 
high job destruction rates in Lithuania, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine are primarily a result of 
high continuing firm contraction, while exit also makes a large contribution in Georgia and 
Hungary.  In contrast to the high levels of job destruction by continuing firms, job creation 
among these firms is subdued in the first few years of the transition everywhere.  The subsequent 
rise in continuing firm job creation occurs near the time of economic recovery, which arrives 
first in Hungary, followed by Romania, Lithuania, Georgia, Russia, and finally Ukraine. 
Coming just after the accumulated misallocations of central planning, the transition might 
have been expected first to bring about a temporary period of extraordinarily high job 
reallocation.  Following this massive industrial restructuring, reallocation rates would then 
converge to developed economy norms.  Such a pattern would be consistent with the discussion 
in Section 2, for instance, of the accumulated misallocation under central planning and the rapid 
liberalization reducing costs of entry and adjustment at the beginning of transition.  For the most 
part, however, total job reallocation rates during the transition lie in the general range (15 to 30 
percent) found in nontransition economies (e.g., Davis and Haltiwanger, 1999; p. 26).  The main 
exceptions are Hungary from 1990 to 1993  and Georgia in 2001-02 and 2004, when job 
reallocation is much higher.  More rapid firm turnover accounts for the faster reallocation only to 
some extent, and most of it is rather due to higher creation and destruction among continuing 
firms.  With the exception of Hungary (the Georgian time series is too short to draw 
conclusions), it appears that liberalization did not produce a big burst of job reallocation after the 
                                                 
19 It is not possible to clean the longitudinal links in the Georgian data as thoroughly as in the other countries, since 
the data do not contain name or location information.  The high Georgian firm turnover rates could at least partly 
reflect spurious exit and entry.  But the job creation and destruction rates among incumbents are also highest in 
Georgia, so incomplete longitudinal links cannot be the full explanation. 
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negligible levels under socialism.  Instead, job reallocation rates rose to developed economy 
levels and, with some fluctuations, have tended to stay within that range. 
Finally, Figure 1d shows within-sector excess job reallocation rates, where sector refers 
to the 2-digit NACE industries described in Section 3.  This type of reallocation is the most 
relevant for studying productivity growth decompositions, which we carry out within sectors, 
following the previous literature.  Within-sector flows of jobs account for most job reallocation, 
generally 83 to 95 percent, which is very similar to the range of previous findings for other 
economies (Davis and Haltiwanger, 1999; p. 2726).  These within-sector flows account for most 
job churning, and they are the focus of the productivity analysis to which we turn next. 
4.2  Productivity Decompositions 
We start our analysis of the contributions of reallocation to productivity growth by 
reviewing previous studies providing long-run FHK results for the U.K. and U.S., as developed 
economy benchmarks.  Table 2 reproduces results from Disney, Haskel, and Heden (2003), 
Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2001), and Haltiwanger (1997).  We add further decomposition 
of net entry, distinguishing proportionate entry using information on entry shares in these 
papers.20  The decomposition period k is 12 years for the U.K. and 10 years for the U.S. 
These studies report a between continuing firm contribution to LP growth that is small in 
both countries (2.81 and 1.84 percentage points in the U.K. and U.S., respectively), and actually 
negative for U.S. MFP (-0.82).  The FHK net entry terms (the sum of proportionate entry, 
disproportionate entry, and exit) are sizeable, which has been interpreted to suggest that firm 
turnover is an important contributor to their productivity growth.  Employing our modified 
decomposition (3), however, we calculate that most of the FHK net entry term is accounted for 
by proportionate entry (73-86 percent, depending on country and LP or MFP).  Taken together, 
exit and disproportionate entry contribute 4.91 and 1.84 percentage points to LP growth over 
these long periods in the U.K. and U.S., respectively, only 7-8 percent of aggregate LP growth.  
For MFP growth, the firm turnover contribution is even smaller:  1.61 percentage points in the 
U.K. and and 0.51 in the U.S.  The total reallocation contribution (between, disproportionate 
entry, and exit) to MFP growth is actually negative for the U.S.  These results suggest that 
productivity growth directly attributable to reallocation is quite modest in the U.K. and U.S. 
Table 2 also shows long-run productivity decompositions for the whole transition period 
in Hungary, Lithuania, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine; k varies from 10 to 15 years according to 
the availability of data.  Total growth is substantial in Hungary, Romania, and Ukraine, while 
Russia’s is relatively small for MFP and slightly negative for LP.21  The within effects are large 
and positive in Hungary, Lithuania, Romania, and also for Ukrainian LP, but negative in Russia 
and for Ukrainian MFP.  Hungary’s between terms are negative, while Lithuania, Romania, 
Russia, and Ukraine’s are positive and much larger than those reported for the U.K. and U.S.  
                                                 
20 These papers report only the net entry contribution, not distinguishing exit and entry effects separately, so they are 
grouped in Table 2. 
21 The totals for the transition countries are averages across sectors using initial-year weights.  LP growth when 
applying final-year weights to final-year productivity is 62.92 percent in Hungary, 102.82 percent in Lithuania, 
59.78 percent in Romania, 9.41 percent in Russia, and 70.75 percent in Ukraine, implying that intersectoral 
reallocation has contributed positively in Hungary, Russia, and Ukraine and negatively in Lithuania and Romania.  
MFP growth using output weights (as with the U.S. MFP decomposition) is 64.71 percent in Hungary, 111.51 
percent in Lithuania, 132.38 percent in Romania, 22.41 percent in Russia, and 89.65 percent in Ukraine.  As 
robustness checks, we have calculated the Russian totals using aggregate deflators, as well as different outlier 
exclusion rules, with similar results.  The lower overall growth in Russia is not driven by any one sector, as nine of 
the nineteen Russian sectors exhibit negative total LP growth and seven have negative MFP growth. 
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The negative cross terms for Hungary, Lithuania, and Romania suggest that firms with growing 
productivity have falling employment shares.22  In contrast, the positive cross-terms for Ukraine 
reflect a positive association of within-firm productivity growth with employment share change. 
Turning to the firm turnover results in Table 2, the contribution of disproportionate entry 
is negative in Hungary and Romania and positive in Ukraine for both LP and MFP, while it is 
positive for LP and negative for MFP in Lithuania and Russia.  The proportionate entry terms 
reflect the growth of average productivity and the entry share; they are generally large and 
positive except in Russia, where both productivity growth and entry shares are smaller.  The exit 
contributions are positive everywhere, reflecting below-average productivity among exitors. 
The FHK net entry terms, which include proportionate entry, are largest in Hungary, 
Lithuania, and Romania, followed by Ukraine, with Russia trailing far behind.  That ordering is 
consistent with economists’ observations that Eastern European growth has been driven by new 
firm entry to a much greater extent than the former Soviet Union (e.g., World Bank, 2002).  But 
if the proportionate entry term is removed, as we have argued it should, then net entry actually 
contributes negatively to LP growth and negligibly to MFP growth in Hungary and Romania.  In 
the former Soviet Republics, the contribution remains positive and, in some cases, large—larger 
than those reported for both the U.K. and U.S.  The total reallocation contribution (not including 
proportionate entry) is largest in Ukraine, followed by Russia, Lithuania, Romania, and 
Hungary—in inverse order of reform progress as evaluated by international financial institutions.   
Next we turn to comparisons across time periods as well as countries.  Did central 
planners raise productivity through reallocation?  Did more productivity-enhancing reallocation 
occur in partially reformed Hungary than in Soviet Russia during the 1980s?  After reforms, did 
the contributions of reallocation to productivity growth increase sharply, and did they fall as 
reforms progressed?  To address these and other questions about the dynamics of the 
productivity growth process, we show time plots of three-year LP growth decompositions in all 
six of our transition economies in Figure 2 (with the precise numbers provided in Appendix 
Table 2).  Each dot in the figures represents the particular component for the three-year period 
ending in the year on the X axis. 
Total growth and the within-continuing-firm contribution follow a “J-curve” pattern in 
each country with a long time series.23  Hungary’s decline begins earlier than in Russia and 
Ukraine, but its trough is much shallower, and the recovery begins several years earlier.  While 
the within-firm contribution is the source of nearly all Hungary’s productivity growth, it is 
important but not dominant elsewhere.  Growth in Georgia, Lithuania, Russia, and Ukraine after 
Russia’s 1998 financial crisis is impressive.24  The cross term, plotted in Figure 2c, is nearly 
always negative in Hungary and Romania, consistent with the long-run decomposition.  The 
cross term changes signs in Russia and Ukraine, however: in the early transition firms with 
growing productivity downsize less, but in later years they contract more.  This pattern is 
                                                 
22 Measurement error can also negatively bias the cross term.  See Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2001). 
23 The within, cross, and proportionate entry terms in this decomposition should be treated with caution, because any 
measurement error in price changes (associated for instance with quality differences or high and volatile inflation) is 
reflected directly in these components.  The reallocation terms do not suffer from the same measurement error 
problems to the extent that these errors are common across firms within an industry-period cell. 
24 The higher productivity growth in Georgia and Ukraine compared to Russia in the 2000s is consistent with those 
countries’ official yearbook real production growth and employment series, which show average production growth 
between 2000 and 2004 of 12.4 percent in Georgia, 6.0 percent in Russia, and 14.7 percent in Ukraine, and 
employment growth of -10.4 percent in Georgia, -9.9 percent in Russia, and -11.7 percent in Ukraine. 
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inconsistent with some economists’ expectation that restructuring would initially involve 
downsizing and only later innovations. 
As shown in Figure 2d, the proportionate entry terms (and the FHK entry term) in the 
early years of Hungary’s transition are highly volatile, showing very large and negative 
contributions in the 3-year periods ending in 1991 and 1992, then large and positive 
contributions in the periods ending in 1994 and 1995.  These massive swings surely reflect a 
large volume of entry during a time when measured within-firm productivity growth is highly 
volatile and sensitive to imperfect price deflators, rather than changes in the quality of 
entrepreneurship.  The term is relatively unimportant in Hungary in later years and in the other 
countries, with the exception of Georgia and Ukraine in the 2000s, where it is significantly 
positive. 
The disproportionate entry contributions are also somewhat volatile, but much less so 
(note the different scale in Figure 2e compared to 2d).  More strikingly, they are negative in most 
countries and time periods, with particularly large negative contributions in Hungary, Romania, 
and Lithuania.  The exit contributions, plotted in Figure 2f, increase first in Hungary, but become 
largest in Georgia, Lithuania, and Ukraine from about 1998 onwards. 
The total contribution of reallocation to productivity growth, including the between 
disproportionate entry, and exit components, is displayed for these 3-year periods in Figure 2g.  
During the central planning period the total contribution is virtually zero, and it is only slightly 
higher in partially reformed Hungary than in Soviet Russia and Ukraine (where the 3-year period 
1989-1992 may be compared).  Once the transition begins, the contribution increases sharply, 
rising from 0.52 in 1987-1990 to 11.75 percentage points of growth in 1992-1995 in Hungary, 
from -0.74 in 1989-92 to 5.33 in 1992-95 in Russia, and from 0.57 in 1989-92 to 2.75 in 1992-95 
in Ukraine.  The bulk of the gain comes from between continuing firm reallocation.  
In Hungary, the reallocation contribution to productivity growth peaks in 1992-95, when 
it is the highest among the countries observed in that period.  Romania’s contribution is second 
highest, followed by Russia, and last by Ukraine; at this point, the ranking of countries by the 
magnitude of the contribution is the same as the rankings of their reforms by the international 
financial institutions.  The moment passes quickly, however, as the Hungarian contribution drops 
quickly, and after 1994-97 it never exceeds 6 percentage points; following the 1999-2002 period 
it is essentially zero.  Though Hungary has large contributions from between reallocation and 
exit in most years, its total reallocation contribution is reduced by a negative disproportionate 
entry term.  The sum of the exit and disproportionate entry terms is also negative.  In Romania, 
the total contribution remains relatively flat at around 10 percentage points, but a large negative 
disproportionate entry term tends to dominate the positive exit contribution as well.  In both of 
these cases, firm turnover does not contribute to aggregate productivity growth, which is  
consistent with the presence of low entry barriers and high exit thresholds. 
By contrast, the reallocation contribution rises to double-digit levels in Russia and 
Ukraine during the late 1990s.  Continuing firm reallocation and exit contribute roughly equally 
to the rise in Russia, while more of it comes from continuing firm reallocation in Ukraine.  
Georgia has the highest reallocation contribution (45.33 percentage points in 2000-03), and its 
between and exit terms are both large.  This shows that the productivity boom in these countries 
since Russia’s 1998 financial crisis has not come simply from a restoration of incumbent firms’ 
pre-transition output levels.  These patterns may reflect higher entry barriers and lower exit 
thresholds in the less advanced reformers. 
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Lithuania and Romania, which are to some extent intermediate cases, also show 
significant reallocation contributions, but only through between continuing firm reallocation, and 
their levels are below those in Georgia, Russia, and Ukraine.  The high between terms in Georgia 
and Ukraine in particular are symptomatic of exit barriers for unproductive firms.  The fact that 
the exit terms begin to rise much later than the between terms, except in Hungary, is also 
consistent with there being exit barriers in the early transition in the slower reformers. 
The substantial cross-country differences in these results are due neither to variation in 
industrial composition, as discussed further in the next section, nor to differences in coverage of 
the small enterprise sector (which may be lower in the Georgian, Lithuanian, and Russian 
registries compared to the other countries).  As a check on whether the latter consideration 
influences the results, Appendix Figure 1 shows the total reallocation contribution from three-
year LP decompositions with samples where employment of 100 or below is set to missing, entry 
is defined as the first year a firm has more than 100 employees, and exit is defined as the year 
after the last year the firm has more than 100 employees.  The cross-country and over-time 
patterns in the results are qualitatively similar to the ones including all firms in Figure 2g. 
The results are also not sensitive to the choice of period length and LP.  The Appendix 
contains not only the underlying calculations for Figure 2, but also tables with five-year LP and 
three- and five-year MFP decompositions; the cross-country and cross-time patterns are similar.  
The disproportionate entry terms are higher and the exit terms are lower for MFP than LP, 
suggesting lower entrant and higher exitor capital intensity.  Net entry is larger with MFP.  The 
U.K. and U.S. five-year MFP total reallocation contributions are negative.25 
The entry contributions deserve closer examination.  Note that the disproportionate entry 
terms from the 3-year decompositions in Figure 2e combine entrants from three annual cohorts 
that may differ because of learning and selection processes.  We show disproportionate entry 
terms for each cohort separately in Figure 3 and Appendix Table 6.  Older cohorts contribute 
more positively to productivity growth than fresh entrants.  If the current-year entrants were 
removed, nearly all of the net entry terms would be positive, including 14 of 17 in Hungary. 
To measure the disproportionate contribution of entrant learning and selection to 
productivity growth within a two-year period, we calculate the difference between the 
contributions of a cohort at two-years-old and at entry in Figure 3d.  The difference is nearly 
always positive, suggesting that productivity-enhancing learning and selection have made 
disproportionate contributions (above trend growth for the sector) to productivity growth.  The 
effect has been stronger in Romania and even more so in Hungary than in Russia and Ukraine.  
Russian and Ukrainian entrants begin with similar productivity to incumbents, changing little as 
they age, while Hungarian and Romanian entrants are initially much less unproductive than 
incumbents, but the surviving entrants catch up to incumbents a year or two later.  This suggests 
that Russia and Ukraine have higher entry barriers, while Hungary and Romania have more 
entrepreneurial experimentation, learning, and selection.26  
We measure the extent to which entry cohorts catch up to incumbents via learning vs. 
selection by calculating two-year labor productivity decompositions for each entry cohort, where 
                                                 
25 Results are also robust to the choice of weights (output versus employment) both within and across sectors. 
26 Though not displayed here, we have also calculated separate disproportionate entry terms for the longer-run 
decompositions, and even most older Hungarian cohorts perform only about as well as incumbents, and their 
contributions generally lag those of similarly-aged Russian and Ukrainian cohorts.  Hungary’s entrant performance 
is similar to that in the U.K.—results in Disney et al. (2000) show that only one entry cohort’s productivity is higher 
than that of incumbents in the final year of its 1980-1992 decomposition.  These results imply stronger age-
productivity correlations in more advanced economies. 
 16
entrant labor productivity is deviated from the contemporaneous industry level.  The within-firm 
productivity growth term is the learning, and selection is the between and exit terms.  Figure 4 
shows the averages among all entry cohorts since the transition began that are available in our 
data.  The selection contributions are quite similar across countries, while learning is much 
greater in Hungary and Romania both relative to their selection contributions and compared to 
the learning terms in the other countries.  Learning is less important than selection in Russia and 
especially Ukraine.  These results are consistent with new firms facing lower costs of investment 
in the more advanced reformers (investment facilitates learning). 
To summarize the results in this subsection, the rise in the reallocation contribution in the 
transition period relative to the socialist period is consistent with the hypothesis that market 
institutions facilitate productivity-enhancing reallocation, but the larger size of reallocation 
contributions in Georgia, Russia, and Ukraine compared to Lithuania, Romania, and especially 
Hungary, the U.K., and the U.S. is not.  The timing of the rise in the reallocation contribution 
shows an initial burst followed by decline only in Hungary, but the burst is short-lived, peaking 
in the early 1990s and essentially disappearing after about 2000.  In the other countries, we 
observe a steadier rise to levels that remain high and that exceed the Hungarian peak in Russia, 
Ukraine, and Georgia.  Moreover, it is striking that even older entry cohorts in Hungary, 
Romania, and Lithuania do not contribute positively to productivity growth, and generally less 
than in Georgia, Russia, and Ukraine.  The next section provides a deeper investigation into 
cross-country differences in the reallocation contribution. 
4.3.  Analyzing Differences in Productivity-Enhancing Reallocation 
What factors lead to higher contributions of reallocation to productivity growth?  We 
focus on three fundamental conditions:  the volume of reallocation, the dispersion of 
productivity, and the correlation of reallocation and productivity differentials.  We decompose 
the total contribution of reallocation, defined as the sum of the between, disproportionate entry, 
and exit terms in equation (4), into these three terms, measured as the standard deviation of 
employment share changes, the standard deviation of productivity, and correlation between share 
change and relative productivity.  The difference in the reallocation contribution between sectors 
(or countries or time periods) i and j can be decomposed in the following way:  
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 The first term in this equation is the productivity dispersion component. Gaps in 
productivity across firms create the potential for productivity-enhancing reallocation—without 
these gaps, reallocation can have no productivity effect.  Productivity dispersion can thus be 
considered a measure of “cleansing potential.”  The employment share change dispersion 
component is the second term.  Ceteris paribus, the more reallocation occurs across firms, the 
more it can affect productivity growth.  This can be thought of as reallocation intensity or 
volume.  The third term is the reallocation-productivity correlation component.  A positive 
correlation is essential for reallocation to be productivity-enhancing.  The stronger the 
correlation, the more precise is the targeting of reallocation from less productive toward more 
productive firms.  We first analyze each of the components, focused on the case of three-year 
periods and labor productivity, and then we report the results from decomposition (5).   
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One would expect productivity dispersion to display an inverse U-shaped pattern as a 
function of market reform.  An abrupt shift in prices and markets may be advantageous for some 
firms but disadvantageous for others.  Firms are unlikely to adapt equally well to the new market 
environment.  New firms will enter and experiment, some with high and others with low 
productivity; as they learn, a selection process will tend to make them more homogenous.  Exit 
will also reduce heterogeneity, but weaker firms may be allowed to survive in countries 
implementing only partial reform, while they are pushed out with more complete reform.  
Together, these forces imply an inverse-U shaped profile.  Figure 5a presents the standard 
deviation of labor productivity using initial year productivity (except for entrants, whose 
productivity is measured in the final year—three years later in this three-year decomposition 
case).27  Productivity dispersion is very similar across the five countries where we can measure it 
on the eve of the transition, as well as to the United Kingdom.28  It rises by 60-240 percent after 
the introduction of reform, then plateaus.  The fact that it plateaus suggests that cleansing of less 
productive firms is sufficient to prevent a further increase in dispersion, but not enough to bring 
it down to levels found in developed market economies.  It both increases and plateaus earliest in 
Hungary and latest in Ukraine.  In the later transition heterogeneity is highest in Ukraine, 
followed by Georgia, Lithuania, Russia, Romania, and Hungary, roughly in inverse order of 
reform progress in the early transition.   
This massive productivity dispersion increase could simply be an uncovering of pre-
existing gaps between firms that were hidden due to features of central planning such as fixed 
input and output prices and absence of competition.  Alternatively, the physical and human 
capital needed to perform well in centrally planned and market systems may be very different.  
The former would suggest little change in firms’ relative productivity rankings and the latter 
substantial change.  To investigate this we calculate the correlation between the productivity 
ranks of continuing firms across three-year periods.  Figure 5b shows one minus this correlation.  
Prior to the transition, firm ranks change very little, though more in Hungary than Russia 
(perhaps reflecting the partial reform process in Hungary).  A large amount of rank change 
occurs at the beginning of the transition, then the pace falls somewhat.  Romania’s rank change 
is usually highest, followed closely by Lithuania and Georgia, while Hungary, Russia, and 
Ukraine’s are somewhat lower during the later years.  The large increase in rank change 
coincides with the rise in productivity dispersion, suggesting that the greater dispersion is not 
just an uncovering of inherited gaps.  
Similar to the job reallocation analysis in Section 4.1 are the results in Figure 5c for the 
standard deviation of employment share changes across three-year periods (multiplied by the 
number of firms appearing in one or both years).  Within-sector reallocation increases 
dramatically with reform in Hungary, but much more gradually in Russia and Ukraine.  During 
the later years Georgia, Hungary, and Romania have the highest volumes, about twice as large as 
in Russia. 
Privatization and improved corporate governance should reorient firms toward profit 
maximization, implying that successful firms should strive to increase market share and 
unsuccessful ones should contract.  Competition should also force the weaker firms to contract 
and exit.  These factors would suggest that targeting of reallocation should improve with market 
reform.  On the other hand, high reallocation volume sparked by reform could result in weaker 
                                                 
27 Appendix Table 7 shows the numbers behind Figures 4 and 5a-5c. 
28 Disney et al. (2003) report labor productivity variance of 0.44 in the United Kingdom manufacturing sector in 
1992, which translates into a standard deviation of 0.66. 
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average targeting.  The employment share change-productivity correlation across three-year 
periods is displayed in Figure 5d.  The Russian and Hungarian correlations fall in the early 
transition compared to the late central planning period. Their correlations then rise, as does 
Ukraine’s.  Russia and Ukraine’s improvements in targeting are much greater than Hungary’s, 
however.  Reallocation in Russia, Ukraine, and Georgia has been quite well targeted in recent 
years, and Lithuania and Romania’s reallocation is also targeted more toward productive firms.  
In contrast, Hungary’s reallocation-productivity correlation has hovered around zero. 
We next analyze the extent to which the three components account for differences 
between the reallocation contributions across countries in the early transition (1992-1995) in 
Table 3a.  As with the productivity growth decompositions, the results are averages over the 19 
sectors, weighted by employment.  Here the employment shares are those of the second country 
listed.  A fourth term, industry share effect, is the residual between the actual difference in 
reallocation contributions using each country’s own weights and the difference when using the 
second-listed country’s weights for both countries.  Hungary’s higher reallocation contribution in 
the early transition can be explained mainly by its higher reallocation volume, but also to some 
extent by having higher productivity dispersion than Russia and Ukraine.  Hungary’s reallocation 
contribution would have been over four percentage points higher had its targeting of the 
reallocation been as good as in Romania, Russia, and Ukraine. 
Decompositions of the differences in reallocation contributions across countries in the 
most recent period are shown in Table 3b.  Hungary’s fall from having the highest to the lowest 
reallocation contribution to productivity growth can be accounted for by a reduction in the size 
of the gap between Hungary’s reallocation volume and that of the other countries, higher 
productivity dispersion in the other countries, and especially by much better targeting of 
reallocation in the direction of more productive firms elsewhere.  More precise targeting leads to 
7-42 percentage points higher reallocation contributions in the other countries relative to 
Hungary.  Romania has a higher reallocation contribution than Lithuania mainly due to higher 
reallocation volume, while Georgia, Russia, and Ukraine have higher contributions due to better 
targeting. The lower reallocation contribution in Romania relative to Georgia, Russia, and 
Ukraine follows a similar pattern to Hungary’s, where Romanian reallocation volume is higher, 
but productivity dispersion is lower, and targeting is much worse. Russia’s contribution is lower 
than in Georgia and Ukraine because of lower reallocation volume and productivity dispersion. 
The components of the reallocation effect may be interrelated.  High productivity 
dispersion could facilitate the targeting of reallocation (entrepreneurs will have better 
information about whether they should increase or decrease market share) and may encourage a 
higher volume of reallocation, since reallocation gains are higher.  Good targeting and high 
reallocation volume can lower productivity dispersion (the less productive firms downsize and 
exit).  High reallocation volume may hinder targeting and produce higher productivity 
dispersion, which would be consistent with hyperkinesis (Caballero and Hammour, 1996). 
We test whether such associations exist in the data in the regression analysis shown in 
Table 4.  The regressions exploit variation within industries and countries across time.  The 
observations are industry-country-year cells for modified versions of components of the 
reallocation contribution to three-year labor productivity growth.29  Industry, country, and year 
                                                 
29 Note that the initial incumbent productivity dispersion measure here is not the same as the productivity dispersion 
measure that is a component of the reallocation contribution, as subsequent entrants are excluded from initial 
incumbent productivity dispersion.  Including entrants in initial productivity dispersion could introduce a 
simultaneity problem, as employment share change dispersion will be higher if entry is higher, and higher entry is 
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effects are included as controls.  The first column shows that initial incumbent productivity 
dispersion is associated with significantly higher reallocation volume.  The coefficient implies 
that moving from Ukraine’s incumbent productivity dispersion in 1989 to that in 1999 would 
yield 99.6 percent higher employment share change dispersion, which is close to the same 
amount that Ukraine’s employment share change dispersion actually increased during the period.  
As shown in column 2, initial incumbent productivity dispersion is associated with better 
targeting of reallocation toward more productive firms.  According to the coefficient, moving 
from Ukraine’s incumbent productivity dispersion in 1989 to that in 1999 results in 0.076 higher 
correlation between employment share change and productivity, which is nearly as much as 
Ukraine’s correlation increased in reality.  Change in incumbent productivity dispersion can be 
thought of as a measure of the amount of cleansing within the group: if less productive firms 
exit, then productivity dispersion should fall.   
The regression in column 3 tests whether incumbents’ reallocation volume and targeting 
reduce their productivity dispersion.  Both are negatively associated with incumbent productivity 
dispersion, though targeting is not quite statistically significant.  Increasing Ukraine’s 
reallocation volume among incumbents in 2002-2005 to that in Hungary at the same time would 
yield a 0.020 drop in productivity dispersion.  Replacing Hungary’s incumbent share change-
productivity correlation in 2002-2005 with that of Ukraine would reduce incumbent productivity 
dispersion by 0.010.  This suggests that it would take many years of reallocation volume at 
Hungary’s rate and Ukraine’s precision for Ukraine’s productivity dispersion to fall to Hungary’s 
level (Ukraine’s productivity dispersion in 2005 among firms producing since 2002 is 0.48 
higher than Hungary’s).  Column four, which includes a squared term for reallocation volume, 
suggests diminishing returns for reallocation volume to reduce productivity dispersion.  None of 
the countries are in the range where the marginal effect of reallocation volume on productivity 
dispersion change is positive, however, so hyperkinesis appears not to be a major factor.   
5.  Conclusion 
This paper measures the contribution of employment reallocation to aggregate 
productivity growth using manufacturing census data in Georgia, Hungary, Lithuania, Romania, 
Russia, and Ukraine.  Reallocation contributes negligibly to productivity growth during the 
socialist period, although more in partially reformed Hungary than centrally planned Soviet 
Russia.  After reform, reallocation contributes much more than previously reported for the 
United Kingdom and United States.  In Hungary, the fastest reformer in this group, the 
magnitude of the contribution is high in the early transition years, but then declines to nearly 
zero by the late 1990s.  In Ukraine and Russia, the slowest reformers, the contribution is 
relatively low initially and grows significantly as the transition progresses, reaching very high 
levels by international standards in both these countries and Georgia.  In Romania and Lithuania, 
the intermediate reformers, the situation is likewise intermediate, with moderate rises in the 
contribution that tend to be sustained.  In all countries, reallocation between continuing firms is 
strongly productivity-enhancing, but firm turnover is productivity-enhancing only in Georgia, 
Russia, Ukraine, and sometimes Lithuania. 
The patterns of differences across countries and over time are not due to differences in 
data definitions, samples, and procedures, nor to decomposition methods, productivity 
                                                                                                                                                             
likely associated with greater productivity dispersion among the entrants.   The productivity dispersion change 
regressions do not include entrants in either the dependent or independent variables, as the focus here is on the 
cleansing process among incumbents, not entrants.  Again, greater entry (and thus reallocation volume when 
including entry) is likely to lead to temporarily higher productivity dispersion. 
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measurement, or industrial composition.  They appear to be robust along all these dimensions.  
However, they are not fully consistent with the standard presumption that reform increases 
productivity-enhancing reallocation.  Reallocation has become more productivity-enhancing 
since the transition began, and Russia and Ukraine’s reallocation contributions have increased as 
more reform has been implemented.  But the hypothesis doesn’t explain why more gradually 
reforming Georgia, Russia, and Ukraine have experienced reallocation contributions so much 
higher than faster reforming Hungary, Lithuania, and Romania’s.  The relationship between 
reform and productivity-enhancing reallocation thus appears to be inverse U-shaped.  The results 
do not support the presence of hyperkinesis either, as Russian and Ukrainian reallocation volume 
and its contribution to productivity increase in tandem, and Georgia’s reallocation volume is also 
both high and productivity-enhancing. 
What then can explain why the reallocation contribution is higher in the slower 
reformers?  As reform is introduced, firms face a new environment; some adapt better than 
others, creating productivity gaps.  High inflation and lingering price controls raise uncertainty 
about productivity of entrants and incumbents, and state subsidies raise costs of exit (by lowering 
fixed costs of operating).  The longer an economy remains in a state of incomplete liberalization 
and stabilization, with high adjustment costs, the more productivity dispersion rises, resulting in 
greater potential for gains from cleansing.  Slower initial reallocation volume leads to a later high 
contribution to productivity not because slower reallocation creates better matches, but rather 
because the slow pace of reallocation allows productivity gaps to widen.  In contrast to the 
transition economies, the low adjustment cost economies of the U.K. and U.S. have been 
continually swept clean of less productive firms, reducing the scope for reallocation to contribute 
to productivity growth.  This story is consistent with standard models of industry dynamics, and 
it is reinforced by our regression results relating difference components of the reallocation 
contribution:  incumbent productivity dispersion tends to raise reallocation volume and the 
quality of targeting, while higher reallocation volume and better targeting tend to reduce 
incumbent productivity dispersion.  
Contrary to the expectations of some economists, we find that the measured contribution 
of initial entrants to productivity growth is negative, particularly in the advanced reformers.30  
The lower entry and exit barriers in the more liberalized reformers are associated with greater 
experimentation: more low-productivity firms enter, pulling down the entry contribution to 
productivity growth.  The learning and selection process among the new entrants is more 
intensive in advanced reformers, though, so the surviving entrants achieve similar productivity 
levels as surviving incumbents within a year or two.  The entry contribution in advanced 
reformers is also reduced by the faster within-firm productivity growth among surviving 
advanced-reform-country incumbents, so catching up to surviving incumbents is a greater 
achievement under these circumstances. 
An important lesson emerging from this analysis is that a large contribution of 
reallocation to aggregate productivity growth is a second-best outcome.  It would have been 
better if some firms had not had such difficulty adapting to the new market environment and 
experienced precipitous productivity drops, or if they had exited before falling so far behind.  
Indeed, the relationship between reform and the within-firm productivity contribution appears to 
be U-shaped—Hungary, for example, has experienced higher overall productivity growth during 
the transition than the other countries, and most of it was achieved through within-firm 
                                                 
30 It is important to reiterate that reallocation could also contribute indirectly, as entrants and expanding incumbents 
could discipline other incumbents to increase productivity or exit.  This is a topic we leave for future research. 
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productivity growth.31  Given that the productivity gaps have formed, though, the slower 
reformers would be much worse off if the reallocation they have experienced had been blocked.  
The continued presence of these gaps suggests that the potential exists for much more 
reallocation-induced productivity growth well into the future. 
It would be difficult to discern these lessons from the conventional measures of the 
contributions of entry and net entry employed in previous studies.  At face value, the standard 
entry term suggests that entry is an important source of productivity growth in the U.K. and U.S., 
and that it is more important in Hungary and Romania than in Ukraine or Russia.  As is evident 
in our results, however, the conventional measures are highly sensitive to the share of new 
entrants and trend productivity growth. We address this problem by decomposing the standard 
entry term into proportionate and disproportionate entry, and we argue that the latter is the most 
useful for evaluating entry's contribution. The results show that entrant productivity is actually 
lower on average than that of surviving incumbents in several of the countries, particularly over 
shorter decomposition periods.  By calculating separate disproportionate entry terms for each 
entry cohort, we show that the disproportionate entry contribution of all cohorts together is 
reduced by the most recent cohorts; older cohorts tend not to make negative contributions to 
productivity growth.  We also find that the higher Russian and Ukrainian overall 
disproportionate entry contributions are due to initial productivity levels that are similar to those 
of incumbents, but more intensive learning and selection processes in Hungary and Romania 
enable entrants, whose initial productivity falls significantly short of incumbents, to catch up 
within two years.  This stark contrast may reflect differences in entry and investment costs 
associated with the business environment in the former Soviet versus the EU member states. 
We decompose the total reallocation contribution to productivity into productivity 
dispersion (cleansing potential), reallocation volume, and targeting of the reallocation toward 
more productive firms.  The decomposition analysis illustrates how productivity-enhancing 
reallocation is not simply a matter of having high reallocation volume.  Despite their 
significantly lower volume, Georgia, Russia, and Ukraine have had much higher reallocation 
contributions to productivity growth than Hungary, Lithuania, and Romania because of larger 
productivity gaps and much better targeting.  Finally, we take advantage of within-industry 
variation across time to identify relationships among the different components of productivity-
enhancing reallocation, which provides support for the hypothesis that productivity dispersion 
encourages reallocation volume and facilitates targeting, while volume and targeting reduce 
dispersion. 
We have found that the transition economy reforms and recessions were characterized by 
highly idiosyncratic shocks across firms, which can help explain the rise in productivity-
enhancing reallocation.  It would be useful to conduct this analysis in other economies to see if it 
is more generally true.  Our reallocation contribution decomposition could also help explain 
differences in the contribution of productivity-enhancing reallocation to productivity growth 
across time, sectors, regions, and countries.  One might expect variation in technologies and 
institutions (e.g., labor market and corporate governance institutions) to lead to differences in 
productivity dispersion, reallocation volume, and the quality of reallocation targeting. 
                                                 
31 If firms with lower productivity growth or with less potential for future productivity growth exit, the firms that 
remain will have higher average within-firm productivity growth, which could help explain Hungary’s superior 
within-firm productivity growth.  
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Figure 1: Annual Job Reallocation Rates 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
   










Note: The numbers behind these figures are in Appendix Table 2.  Total reallocation 
contribution is defined as between contribution plus disproportionate entry contribution 
plus exit contribution.   
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Figure 3: Disentangling the Entry Contribution 























































































































































































































































Note: These are disproportionate entry terms separately for each of the three entry cohorts in the three-year 
LP decompositions.  Figure 11 takes the difference between the year T-2 contributions and what they were 
two years earlier as year T contributions.  The numbers behind these figures are in Appendix Table 5. 
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Note: Learning is the within term, and selection is the sum of the between and exit terms from 
a two-year labor productivity growth decomposition (minus entry terms) for fresh entrants, 
where firms’ labor productivity is deviated from the contemporaneous industry level.  These 
are average numbers over all two-year periods after the beginning of the transition (i.e., 
starting with 1991 entrants in Hungary, 1993 entrants in Romania, Russia, and Ukraine, and 
all available cohorts in Georgia and Lithuania).    
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Figure 5: Reallocation and Labor Productivity Components 































































































































































































































































Note:  Three-year averages using the samples for the three-year labor productivity decompositions.  The year on the x- 
axis refers to the final year in the decomposition.  The numbers for these figures are shown in Appendix Table 6. 
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Table 1:  Mean Output, Employment and Capital Stock 
in the First and Last Years of Analysis 
 
 Employment  Output or Sales  Capital Stock 
 First year Last year  First year Last year  First year Last year 
Georgia 30.9 23.9 302.5 526.2 442.0 342.4 
 (122.9) (87.6) (1,517.6) (3,291.5) (3935.4) (2,033.3) 
Hungary 700.1 23.7 7,054.2 594.5 2,364.1 190.0 
 (1,181.0) (138.7) (22,492.0) (14,377.8) (9,372.5) (3,514.5) 
Lithuania 131.1 45.1 6,465.5 7,296.8 3,362.0 2,712.6 
 (404.8) (148.7) (30,697.9) (158,200.7) (16,159.0) (28,307.3) 
Romania 257.3 35.3 105,167.7 38,879.0 835,676.5 22,640.7 
 (1062.4) (182.5) (682,720.1) (605,725.2) (3,365,040.2) (327,126.2) 
Russia 819.9 366.9  520.4 525.5 355.3 827.6 
 (2,637.7) (1,461.9)  (1499.8) (5,674.7) (1,439.6) (18,959.7) 
Ukraine 783.2 85.8  53.9 13.2 37.2 17.2 
 (1,865.9) (764.1)  (170.5) (201.4) (168.6) (418.9)  
Note:  The first year of analysis is 1985 in Russia, 1986 in Hungary, 1989 in Ukraine, 1992 in Romania, 1995 in Lithuania, 
and 2000 in Georgia; the last year is 2004 in Georgia and Russia, 2005 for Hungary and Lithuania, and 2006 for Romania 
and Ukraine.  Employment is the average annual number of all registered employees, except in Russia, where it excludes 
personnel working in non-industrial divisions.  Output or sales refers to sales in Georgia, Hungary, Lithuania, Romania, 
and post-2003 Ukraine, and to value of production in Russia and pre-2004 Ukraine.  Capital stock is the book value of 
fixed assets.  Output or sales and capital stock are expressed in constant final-year prices (thousands of 2004 GEL for 
Georgia, millions of 2005 HUF for Hungary, thousands of 2005 LTL for Lithuania, millions of 2006 ROL for Romania, 
millions of 2004 RUB for Russia, and millions 2006 UAH for Ukraine).  Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. 
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Table 2: Long-Run Productivity Growth Decompositions 
 
 Total Within Between Cross Prop. Entry 
Disprop. 
Entry Exit 
United Kingdom        
   1980-1992 LP 70.17 33.68 2.81 -0.70 29.47 4.91* 
   1980-1992 MFP 13.49 0.67 2.02 3.51 5.67 1.61* 
United States        
   1977-1987 LP 23.02 17.03 1.84 -2.53 4.83 1.84* 
   1977-1987 MFP 10.24 4.92 -0.82 3.48 2.15 0.51* 
Hungary        
   1990-2005 LP 53.31 29.31 -1.67 -14.67 43.13 -4.55 1.76 
   1990-2005 MFP 37.94 8.34 -1.85 0.41 30.97 -0.41 0.48 
Lithuania        
   1995-2005 LP 109.63 50.81 4.41 -1.99 50.45 -6.43 12.39 
   1995-2005 MFP 107.48 44.35 8.45 -7.21 50.35 2.55 9.01 
Romania        
   1992-2006 LP 86.09 51.10 7.22 -13.63 41.85 -3.33 2.88 
   1992-2006 MFP 89.75 46.88 4.26 -8.67 46.12 -1.50 2.66 
Russia        
   1992-2004 LP -1.98 -11.69 7.12 1.22 -2.58 -1.85 5.80 
   1992-2004 MFP 9.26 -2.81 6.23 -2.18 1.88 2.24 3.90 
Ukraine        
   1992-2006 LP 67.46 17.64 7.74 11.21 24.65 3.24 2.98 
   1992-2006 MFP 54.21 -0.21 7.39 16.69 22.98 4.34 3.02 




itetet Pps 111 , so a 
positive value means a positive contribution to productivity growth.  The U.K. results are based on Disney, 
Haskel, and Heden (2003), and the U.S. numbers on Haltiwanger (1997) and Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan 
(2001).  These papers apply a similar equation (except that the Entry and Exit components are combined, and 
Proportionate Entry is not distinguished) to establishment data, using base-year worker-hours (U.K. LP and MFP 
and U.S. LP) or output (U.S. MFP) as weights; the labor measure is worker-hours.  The Proportionate Entry 
numbers for the U.S. and U.K. are our calculations based on figures available in the text of these papers. 
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Romania–Hungary 1.18 -7.61 4.78 -0.93 -2.58 
Russia–Hungary -1.39 -9.32 4.46 -0.17 -6.43 
Ukraine–Hungary -3.22 -11.84 6.92 -0.85 -9.00 
Russia–Romania -1.48 -6.92 4.91 -0.36 -3.84 
Ukraine–Romania -5.03 -15.02 14.68 -1.05 -6.42 
Ukraine–Russia -1.13 -2.75 1.51 -0.21 -2.58 
Note: These are decompositions of the differences in the total reallocation contribution to three-year labor productivity growth in 
the two countries in 1992-1995, applying equation (5).  The numbers are percentage points of productivity growth. 
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Table 3b: Decomposition of Cross-Country Reallocation Contribution Differences 


















Georgia–Hungary 2001-2004 2.92 -12.46 42.31 3.90 36.66 
Lithuania–Hungary 2002-2005 0.40 -3.12 7.38 0.66 5.33 
Romania–Hungary 2002-2005 0.69 -0.96 13.07 -2.35 10.45 
Russia–Hungary 2001-2004 2.10 -9.65 27.59 -3.86 16.17 
Ukraine–Hungary 2002-2005 5.09 -6.18 25.42 -5.42 18.91 
Georgia–Lithuania 2001-2004 1.63 3.61 23.08 -0.95 27.36 
Romania–Lithuania 2002-2005 -0.25 3.81 1.43 0.13 5.12 
Russia–Lithuania 2002-2005 -0.25 -2.02 15.70 -6.56 6.87 
Ukraine–Lithuania 2002-2005 3.44 2.33 14.24 -6.43 13.58 
Georgia–Romania 2001-2004 3.26 -5.87 19.27 8.10 24.76 
Russia–Romania 2001-2004 0.54 -6.69 13.98 -3.56 4.27 
Ukraine–Romania 2003-2006 3.55 -4.14 8.76 -4.96 3.21 
Georgia–Russia 2001-2004 2.99 5.03 7.59 4.89 20.50 
Ukraine–Russia 2001-2004 3.26 3.67 -0.64 -0.74 5.55 
Georgia–Ukraine 2001-2004 -7.02 5.25 20.97 -4.26 14.94 
Note: These are decompositions of the differences in the total reallocation contribution to three-year labor productivity growth 
in the two countries over the stated time period, applying equation (5).  The numbers are percentage points of productivity 
growth. 
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(0.018)   
Incumbent Employment Share 
Change-Productivity 
Correlation 
  -0.142 (0.089) 
-0.147* 
(0.088) 
Incumbent Employment Share 





Incumbent Employment Share 
Change Dispersion Squared    
0.007** 
(0.003) 
R2 0.408 0.251 0.369 0.372 
Note: N = 1,330.  The units of observation are country-industry-year cells, pooling data from Georgia, Hungary, 
Lithuania, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine.  Each regression also contains industry, country, and year effects.  
Standard errors adjusted for clustering on country-industries are in parentheses.  * = significant at the 10 percent 
level, ** = significant at the 5 percent level, and *** = significant at the 1 percent level.  Employment change 
dispersion, employment change-productivity correlation, and productivity dispersion change are over three-year 


















.  The dependent 


































































   
   
   
   










Note: Total reallocation is defined as the sum of between, disproportionate entry, and exit terms.  This 
decomposition is done with samples where employment of 100 or below is set to missing, entry is defined as the 
first year a firm has more than 100 employees, and exit is defined as the year after the last year the firm has more 




Appendix Table 1a:  Job Flows in Georgian Manufacturing 
 
 















2000-01 14.63 31.71 46.34 29.26 29.02 7.82 9.28 
2001-02 12.17 22.76 34.93 24.34 20.93 5.39 6.69 
2002-03 12.73 15.73 28.46 25.46 23.36 3.87 6.66 
2003-04 18.93 23.35 42.28 37.86 25.57 8.09 10.74 
























1986-87 2.27 5.02 7.29 4.54 3.82 0.71 0.16 
1987-88 4.92 7.94 12.86 9.84 9.61 1.90 0.48 
1988-89 1.31 18.31 19.62 2.62 2.61 0.52 0.33 
1989-90 25.02 12.06 37.08 24.12 19.69 8.98 1.14 
1990-91 16.99 27.27 44.26 33.98 31.78 8.76 4.72 
1991-92 23.82 33.96 57.78 47.64 44.69 17.11 11.74 
1992-93 18.29 30.42 48.71 36.58 35.87 11.68 12.53 
1993-94 11.87 18.01 29.88 23.73 23.16 5.13 6.27 
1994-95 11.26 12.24 23.49 22.51 20.76 2.86 4.04 
1995-96 10.35 11.43 21.78 20.69 17.20 2.67 3.03 
1996-97 12.22 9.63 21.85 19.26 17.38 3.03 2.88 
1997-98 11.56 8.05 19.61 16.10 15.12 2.11 2.10 
1998-99 9.72 10.49 20.21 19.44 15.34 2.00 2.33 
1999-00 12.31 11.34 23.65 22.68 16.51 2.33 3.45 
2000-01 9.49 9.07 18.56 18.14 15.73 2.01 2.23 
2001-02 8.07 11.77 19.84 16.15 15.39 2.13 2.46 
2002-03 9.15 12.34 21.49 18.30 16.53 1.69 3.51 
2003-04 11.15 12.48 23.63 22.29 17.20 4.11 3.07 
2004-05 8.23 12.43 20.66 16.47 15.98 1.69 4.49 
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1995-96 11.48 15.01 26.49 22.96 18.26 7.52 1.19 
1996-97 11.55 14.79 26.34 23.10 18.59 5.35 1.99 
1997-98 10.79 12.69 23.48 21.58 17.42 5.14 1.95 
1998-99 11.31 11.86 23.17 22.61 18.41 6.79 0.63 
1999-00 12.55 12.41 24.95 24.82 19.50 3.09 0.38 
2000-01 11.57 12.92 24.49 23.14 20.72 2.69 2.20 
2001-02 12.55 9.42 21.97 18.85 16.86 3.08 2.31 
2002-03 14.73 8.39 23.12 16.78 16.17 4.02 1.68 
2003-04 11.20 12.79 23.99 22.40 15.32 2.24 1.53 
























1992-93 4.27 11.74 16.01 8.54 8.33 2.13 0.19 
1993-94 9.75 13.55 23.30 19.49 19.49 1.45 0.15 
1994-95 3.89 9.59 13.48 7.79 7.73 1.03 0.13 
1995-96 6.38 6.88 13.25 12.75 9.91 0.70 0.25 
1996-97 6.95 9.25 16.21 13.91 11.82 1.04 0.15 
1997-98 5.80 18.66 24.46 11.60 10.13 1.19 0.31 
1998-99 6.22 17.07 23.30 12.45 11.49 1.41 0.45 
1999-00 9.65 15.55 25.20 19.29 16.39 1.48 0.48 
2000-01 11.35 10.56 21.91 21.12 17.62 1.90 0.67 
2001-02 10.11 12.44 22.55 20.21 18.30 1.99 0.54 
2002-03 10.06 12.79 22.86 20.12 17.93 2.13 0.70 
2003-04 9.90 13.67 23.57 19.80 18.70 2.04 0.79 
2004-05 10.60 14.23 24.84 21.21 18.36 1.99 1.89 
2005-06 9.76 13.61 23.37 19.53 18.14 1.92 2.30 
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1985-86 1.57 1.85 3.43 3.15 2.22 0.00 0.00 
1986-87 1.36 2.52 3.88 2.73 2.66 0.00 0.00 
1987-88 1.40 4.82 6.22 2.79 2.79 0.01 0.00 
1988-89 1.31 4.23 5.55 2.63 2.60 0.02 0.00 
1989-90 1.11 4.83 5.95 2.23 2.23 0.15 0.00 
1990-91 3.06 6.62 9.68 6.12 6.12 0.88 0.00 
1991-92 11.83 7.86 19.69 15.72 12.41 3.98 0.00 
1992-93 4.10 9.32 13.43 8.21 7.83 1.27 0.02 
1993-94 3.63 15.66 19.28 7.25 7.25 1.25 0.53 
1994-95 3.71 14.30 18.02 7.43 7.43 0.97 0.90 
1995-96 3.82 12.39 16.21 7.65 6.25 0.26 1.63 
1996-97 2.33 14.16 16.50 4.66 4.66 0.32 0.79 
1997-98 3.29 11.18 14.47 6.58 6.58 0.50 1.51 
1998-99 6.79 8.41 15.21 13.59 12.98 0.82 1.06 
1999-00 8.67 7.59 16.27 15.19 14.97 1.44 1.31 
2000-01 8.46 7.46 15.92 14.92 13.57 1.94 1.49 
2001-02 9.90 9.70 19.60 19.39 16.59 3.09 1.57 
2002-03 7.63 15.02 22.65 15.27 15.05 3.07 1.48 
























1992-93 5.62 7.83 13.45 11.24 11.24 1.40  
1993-94 4.64 12.60 17.24 9.28 9.28 1.35 0.49 
1994-95 3.16 11.61 14.76 6.32 6.32 0.91 0.49 
1995-96 5.53 12.77 18.30 11.06 10.43 1.95 0.68 
1996-97 11.68 14.62 26.30 23.35 21.29 6.16 0.81 
1997-98 7.26 11.61 18.87 14.52 13.60 3.32 0.86 
1998-99 4.29 11.93 16.23 8.59 8.59 0.78 1.22 
1999-00 11.36 8.18 19.54 16.36 12.78 0.95 0.18 
2000-01 7.00 13.87 20.87 14.00 13.43 1.72 1.68 
2001-02 7.19 11.78 18.97 14.38 14.34 1.76 0.29 
2002-03 7.83 11.59 19.42 15.67 15.28 1.97 1.22 
2003-04 8.12 7.89 16.01 15.78 13.69 0.70 0.39 
2004-05 11.96 7.77 19.73 15.53 14.55 4.46 0.97 
2005-06 6.85 8.73 15.58 13.70 12.37 1.26 0.13 
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Appendix Table 2: Three-Year Labor Productivity Growth Decompositions 
 
 Total Within Between Cross Prop. Entry 
Disprop. 
Entry Exit 
Georgia        
   2000-2003 87.95 40.75 29.15 -14.56 16.43 0.25 15.92 
   2001-2004 74.16 31.43 27.30 -2.44 10.65 -2.93 10.14 
Hungary        
   1986-1989 16.80 20.45 3.94 -8.21 0.48 0.05 0.09 
   1987-1990 -12.04 -5.43 1.95 -4.80 -2.33 -0.71 -0.72 
   1988-1991 -34.61 -21.15 1.22 -2.57 -10.20 -0.44 -1.47 
   1989-1992 -39.00 -30.86 0.81 6.09 -16.53 0.88 0.62 
   1990-1993 -4.65 -8.76 3.73 2.38 -1.08 -1.82 0.89 
   1991-1994 39.37 27.50 3.94 -4.19 15.33 -5.16 1.95 
   1992-1995 36.52 29.99 15.41 -15.46 10.25 -5.61 1.95 
   1993-1996 19.80 15.93 3.54 -1.88 2.92 -4.10 3.39 
   1994-1997 5.49 4.64 7.21 -6.48 0.57 -2.93 2.48 
   1995-1998 5.14 6.61 7.38 -7.90 0.61 -3.56 2.00 
   1996-1999 9.71 10.61 6.51 -7.74 1.29 -3.15 2.18 
   1997-2000 14.79 15.33 4.78 -5.63 1.58 -3.48 2.22 
   1998-2001 18.27 17.71 4.93 -5.08 1.61 -3.00 2.11 
   1999-2002 23.28 22.28 5.39 -5.54 2.12 -2.81 1.83 
   2000-2003 19.75 19.31 0.62 -0.78 1.44 -3.30 2.45 
   2001-2004 14.02 17.72 0.25 -2.61 1.06 -4.80 2.40 
   2002-2005 10.66 14.43 3.56 -5.03 0.73 -6.09 3.06 
Lithuania        
   1995-1998 38.95 27.03 9.85 -4.68 5.89 -2.31 3.17 
   1996-1999 31.94 14.85 7.95 2.62 4.85 -1.38 3.05 
   1997-2000 20.45 9.83 6.04 4.17 2.59 -4.16 1.98 
   1998-2001 22.86 12.41 7.51 2.77 3.30 -4.56 1.43 
   1999-2002 30.94 21.49 8.58 -2.86 3.26 -4.36 4.84 
   2000-2003 32.93 19.28 8.94 -3.13 4.27 -5.46 9.04 
   2001-2004 30.24 18.55 3.33 0.93 3.62 -4.27 8.09 
   2002-2005 30.16 20.97 3.52 -0.53 3.87 -3.98 6.31 
Romania        
   1992-1995 33.57 25.00 9.01 -2.36 1.76 -0.07 0.23 
   1993-1996 18.38 9.22 9.73 -3.50 1.94 0.37 0.60 
   1994-1997 17.35 12.54 7.67 -3.44 1.13 -0.56 0.01 
   1995-1998 0.94 -4.71 11.21 -4.65 -0.43 -0.65 0.17 
   1996-1999 -10.29 -14.94 9.37 -0.74 -1.02 -3.32 0.37 
   1997-2000 5.94 1.83 10.79 -5.89 -0.07 -1.26 0.54 
   1998-2001 13.01 11.31 10.06 -8.02 1.42 -2.19 0.42 
   1999-2002 14.84 12.87 9.83 -6.32 1.11 -2.89 0.23 
   2000-2003 7.89 3.82 9.25 -3.21 0.33 -2.87 0.57 
   2001-2004 22.03 17.20 11.40 -6.20 1.27 -3.44 1.79 
   2002-2005 15.17 10.23 12.29 -6.89 0.87 -4.15 2.83 






 Total Within Between Cross Prop. Entry 
Disprop. 
Entry Exit 
Russia        
   1985-1988 14.97 15.62 -0.02 -0.68 0.01 0.04 0.00 
   1986-1989 13.59 14.30 0.30 -1.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 
   1987-1990 14.57 14.96 0.74 -1.11 0.02 -0.05 0.00 
   1988-1991 3.42 4.08 0.45 -1.03 0.07 -0.14 0.00 
   1989-1992 -6.34 -5.68 1.49 1.28 -1.19 -2.24 0.00 
   1990-1993 -22.18 -24.00 1.69 6.20 -3.13 -2.95 0.00 
   1991-1994 -47.23 -52.78 2.03 10.95 -5.22 -2.29 0.07 
   1992-1995 -53.72 -59.42 5.96 3.05 -2.67 -1.12 0.49 
   1993-1996 -48.90 -57.63 6.98 2.49 -1.88 -0.64 1.78 
   1994-1997 -5.99 -17.35 8.14 1.55 -0.36 -0.25 2.28 
   1995-1998 -7.37 -18.02 7.41 1.42 -0.38 -1.00 3.20 
   1996-1999 14.83 4.68 7.20 -0.82 0.86 -1.23 4.15 
   1997-2000 19.34 8.72 7.31 -1.77 1.41 -1.95 5.61 
   1998-2001 33.81 22.33 6.43 -1.84 2.92 -2.45 6.41 
   1999-2002 20.28 8.28 8.41 -4.28 2.23 -2.53 8.17 
   2000-2003 18.05 4.48 7.24 -1.12 1.93 -1.94 7.47 
   2001-2004 19.07 6.66 8.05 -3.71 2.10 -2.58 8.55 
Ukraine        
   1989-1992 -9.46 -11.63 0.57 1.60 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
   1992-1995 -74.94 -79.83 3.06 4.38 -2.24 -0.33 0.02 
   1993-1996 -88.33 -95.34 4.03 7.35 -4.12 -0.57 0.33 
   1994-1997 -52.10 -61.62 3.73 10.46 -5.24 -0.11 0.68 
   1995-1998 -17.13 -30.13 10.35 2.76 -1.54 0.11 1.32 
   1996-1999 2.41 -8.30 5.91 0.85 0.01 2.42 1.51 
   1997-2000 -14.78 -26.82 14.91 -5.15 -0.99 1.47 1.81 
   1998-2001 9.66 -8.68 20.11 -7.38 0.47 0.21 4.93 
   1999-2002 11.81 -7.65 29.63 -14.41 1.00 -1.19 4.43 
   2000-2003 64.44 40.26 19.93 -4.17 5.61 -2.42 5.23 
   2001-2004 67.99 46.34 16.47 -2.48 4.55 -1.68 4.78 
   2002-2005 55.50 34.97 14.91 -3.70 4.81 -1.23 5.75 
   2003-2006 91.90 75.17 12.65 -6.39 7.99 -1.57 4.05 
Note:  These are labor productivity growth decompositions weighted by base-year employment.  Labor productivity is 
the log of the ratio of real gross output divided by number of employees.  They apply equation (4) in the text.  The exit 




itetet Pps 111 , so a positive exit term value means a positive contribution to productivity growth. 
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Appendix Table 3: Three-Year Multifactor Productivity Growth Decompositions 
 
 Total Within Between Cross Prop. Entry 
Disprop. 
Entry Exit 
Georgia        
   2000-2003 69.04 26.80 19.62 -8.09 13.49 1.40 15.81 
   2001-2004 67.30 27.38 24.18 -0.56 9.36 -0.41 7.36 
Hungary        
   1986-1989 12.35 13.77 2.38 -4.12 0.29 0.16 -0.13 
   1987-1990 -6.92 -3.93 0.95 -2.74 -1.57 1.19 -0.82 
   1988-1991 -28.10 -20.13 1.11 -0.29 -8.15 0.91 -1.54 
   1989-1992 -46.59 -39.02 0.22 11.23 -19.93 -0.05 0.96 
   1990-1993 -24.98 -23.07 -0.03 9.34 -10.43 -3.34 2.56 
   1991-1994 20.42 13.25 0.79 1.64 7.39 -6.01 3.35 
   1992-1995 27.46 18.55 2.99 -0.27 7.17 -5.09 4.10 
   1993-1996 24.97 18.56 2.33 0.30 3.47 -2.64 2.95 
   1994-1997 13.55 9.75 4.07 -1.88 1.39 -1.56 1.77 
   1995-1998 5.92 4.98 4.49 -3.70 0.67 -1.67 1.14 
   1996-1999 7.66 5.64 4.99 -3.84 1.00 -1.24 1.12 
   1997-2000 9.22 7.30 2.98 -1.08 0.96 -1.59 0.65 
   1998-2001 13.36 10.20 4.07 -1.43 1.06 -1.02 0.48 
   1999-2002 16.76 13.78 4.11 -2.13 1.35 -0.37 0.03 
   2000-2003 15.45 12.85 3.26 -1.28 0.91 -0.50 0.22 
   2001-2004 11.12 10.96 1.74 -1.78 0.84 -0.89 0.24 
   2002-2005 10.24 9.28 4.15 -3.70 0.76 -1.60 1.35 
Lithuania        
   1995-1998 31.97 16.09 6.47 0.04 5.17 1.90 2.31 
   1996-1999 27.77 6.62 9.31 2.37 4.45 2.94 2.08 
   1997-2000 19.35 3.38 8.53 2.52 2.60 1.43 0.89 
   1998-2001 25.43 12.05 10.98 -3.07 3.78 1.75 -0.06 
   1999-2002 31.14 20.47 13.80 -10.30 3.31 1.19 2.68 
   2000-2003 31.86 16.39 12.05 -7.57 4.07 0.82 6.10 
   2001-2004 25.73 15.59 8.56 -6.72 2.89 1.43 3.98 
   2002-2005 29.67 18.94 8.23 -5.67 3.53 1.38 3.27 
Romania        
   1992-1995 23.84 15.59 6.62 2.09 0.62 -0.68 -0.39 
   1993-1996 -6.53 -13.40 7.17 0.71 -0.54 -0.04 -0.44 
   1994-1997 40.44 36.41 4.70 -2.20 2.40 -0.84 -0.02 
   1995-1998 16.62 10.74 7.99 -2.00 0.52 -0.57 -0.06 
   1996-1999 0.73 -7.46 8.93 2.37 -0.18 -3.01 0.07 
   1997-2000 2.56 -6.99 9.25 1.31 -0.28 -0.86 0.12 
   1998-2001 12.21 6.16 8.10 -1.97 1.13 -1.31 0.10 
   1999-2002 13.13 7.53 8.51 -2.16 0.95 -1.60 -0.10 
   2000-2003 4.83 -1.69 7.00 0.44 0.12 -1.13 0.09 
   2001-2004 13.92 5.38 9.35 -1.29 0.70 -0.89 0.67 
   2002-2005 9.53 0.82 10.92 -3.33 0.46 -0.63 1.28 






 Total Within Between Cross Prop. Entry 
Disprop. 
Entry Exit 
Russia        
   1985-1988 10.73 11.64 0.27 -1.22 0.01 0.04 0.00 
   1986-1989 10.08 10.98 0.43 -1.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 
   1987-1990 9.54 9.96 0.51 -0.91 0.01 -0.04 0.00 
   1988-1991 1.08 0.80 0.87 -0.77 0.05 0.13 0.00 
   1989-1992 -11.65 -13.10 0.80 2.41 -1.26 -0.50 0.00 
   1990-1993 -21.46 -25.09 1.05 5.59 -2.41 -0.59 0.00 
   1991-1994 -60.62 -65.45 2.48 8.03 -5.01 -0.64 -0.03 
   1992-1995 -47.95 -54.04 5.66 1.99 -1.87 0.14 0.18 
   1993-1996 -45.20 -50.75 6.51 -0.43 -1.45 0.43 0.51 
   1994-1997 -4.23 -13.47 8.40 -0.62 -0.23 0.76 0.93 
   1995-1998 -7.26 -15.63 7.68 -0.97 -0.28 0.49 1.45 
   1996-1999 15.53 7.76 8.58 -5.04 0.93 1.03 2.26 
   1997-2000 17.96 10.52 8.17 -5.17 1.38 -0.17 3.23 
   1998-2001 31.47 23.60 7.40 -5.45 2.41 -0.19 3.70 
   1999-2002 18.31 7.81 7.24 -4.63 1.70 0.52 5.67 
   2000-2003 16.80 4.94 7.44 -3.31 1.54 1.32 4.87 
   2001-2004 15.29 5.62 6.30 -4.12 1.49 1.04 4.96 
Ukraine        
   1989-1992 10.32 9.07 0.56 0.68 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
   1992-1995 -77.40 -81.95 2.74 3.70 -2.22 0.32 0.02 
   1993-1996 -90.36 -96.80 3.55 6.23 -4.06 0.71 0.00 
   1994-1997 -56.34 -65.73 3.33 8.75 -4.18 1.16 0.34 
   1995-1998 -22.30 -35.15 5.53 6.17 -2.11 2.31 0.95 
   1996-1999 0.68 -10.80 6.65 0.83 -0.02 2.82 1.20 
   1997-2000 -19.04 -30.38 14.04 -5.26 -1.32 2.28 1.59 
   1998-2001 1.93 -14.59 18.15 -6.39 -0.18 1.19 3.76 
   1999-2002 9.71 -10.93 28.32 -12.33 0.56 0.43 3.67 
   2000-2003 63.54 37.39 20.12 -3.30 4.55 0.24 4.54 
   2001-2004 64.82 43.88 17.34 -3.55 3.53 0.30 3.33 
   2002-2005 50.87 32.43 15.18 -5.43 3.88 1.12 3.69 
   2003-2006 89.31 72.89 13.93 -8.22 7.00 1.39 2.32 
Note:  These are multifactor productivity growth decompositions weighted by base-year employment. 
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Appendix Table 4: Five-Year Labor Productivity Growth Decompositions 
 
 Total Within Between Cross Prop. Entry 
Disprop. 
Entry Exit 
Hungary        
   1986-1991 -29.33 -15.50 2.29 -5.00 -9.54 -0.12 -1.45 
   1987-1992 -25.23 -18.04 2.21 1.28 -11.28 1.93 -1.34 
   1988-1993 -17.97 -18.04 1.17 6.95 -9.55 2.72 -1.21 
   1989-1994 -15.70 -18.67 -0.50 9.78 -9.35 1.04 2.00 
   1990-1995 17.40 4.89 2.29 0.63 10.65 -2.45 1.40 
   1991-1996 40.64 26.75 3.64 -6.06 18.73 -4.30 1.88 
   1992-1997 38.28 29.32 13.32 -14.66 14.38 -5.54 1.45 
   1993-1998 25.17 21.07 4.17 -5.99 6.49 -4.53 3.96 
   1994-1999 9.42 8.72 8.33 -9.51 2.25 -4.00 3.62 
   1995-2000 15.43 16.23 9.09 -11.05 3.45 -5.56 3.27 
   1996-2001 23.64 22.80 7.47 -9.36 4.61 -5.07 3.19 
   1997-2002 27.63 24.49 6.02 -7.17 4.76 -4.02 3.56 
   1998-2003 29.17 27.15 5.22 -6.61 4.79 -4.11 2.73 
   1999-2004 28.30 29.54 3.96 -8.07 4.94 -4.97 2.90 
   2000-2005 28.15 29.68 3.10 -5.36 3.55 -6.69 3.87 
Lithuania        
   1995-2000 52.04 22.90 8.96 4.88 12.28 -4.46 7.48 
   1996-2001 55.56 26.72 7.90 6.29 13.10 -3.89 5.44 
   1997-2002 45.77 29.22 6.81 -0.09 10.50 -5.76 5.10 
   1998-2003 39.59 26.52 7.50 -1.89 9.97 -7.78 5.27 
   1999-2004 50.01 32.22 8.51 -5.17 10.09 -5.01 9.36 
   2000-2005 55.79 31.70 9.05 -3.95 11.98 -5.32 12.32 
Romania        
   1992-1997 39.58 25.74 9.01 -0.48 4.25 0.48 0.57 
   1993-1998 9.13 -4.08 10.46 -0.19 0.80 1.38 0.76 
   1994-1999 12.70 4.18 10.55 -1.28 1.96 -2.78 0.08 
   1995-2000 9.30 2.89 12.79 -6.80 0.93 -0.86 0.35 
   1996-2001 -0.55 -2.83 12.76 -6.76 -0.41 -3.83 0.52 
   1997-2002 9.65 3.54 12.88 -4.17 0.65 -3.85 0.60 
   1998-2003 21.48 9.20 12.39 -1.99 3.80 -2.68 0.76 
   1999-2004 32.28 25.47 13.64 -8.14 3.99 -4.24 1.57 
   2000-2005 21.40 13.40 12.55 -5.67 2.36 -4.36 3.12 






 Total Within Between Cross Prop. Entry 
Disprop. 
Entry Exit 
Russia        
   1985-1990 20.17 21.10 0.24 -1.18 0.04 -0.02 0.00 
   1986-1991 10.90 11.95 0.23 -1.29 0.16 -0.14 0.00 
   1987-1992 6.32 6.54 1.82 0.30 -0.14 -2.21 0.00 
   1988-1993 -17.87 -19.36 2.22 4.54 -2.39 -2.87 0.00 
   1989-1994 -56.28 -59.80 2.81 12.15 -7.81 -3.64 0.00 
   1990-1995 -63.72 -69.85 2.65 18.29 -11.00 -4.27 0.45 
   1991-1996 -66.44 -76.95 2.62 16.24 -8.46 -1.30 1.41 
   1992-1997 -54.65 -66.69 7.44 7.02 -3.84 -0.63 2.06 
   1993-1998 -45.40 -57.81 7.55 6.85 -3.93 -1.06 2.99 
   1994-1999 -1.24 -17.08 7.17 4.54 -0.38 -0.82 5.32 
   1995-2000 15.55 -1.37 7.15 3.37 1.71 -1.68 6.36 
   1996-2001 37.37 18.29 7.89 0.76 5.08 -2.55 7.91 
   1997-2002 28.14 9.27 6.86 0.37 4.56 -3.30 10.37 
   1998-2003 47.20 24.06 6.19 -0.11 7.83 -2.28 11.51 
   1999-2004 42.19 15.29 9.72 -2.42 7.71 -2.36 14.24 
Ukraine        
   1989-1994 -58.04 -62.15 1.44 6.05 -2.35 -1.04 0.01 
   1992-1997 -101.30 -112.22 3.58 22.56 -14.75 -0.90 0.44 
   1993-1998 -88.32 -102.79 5.04 21.01 -12.67 -0.08 1.18 
   1994-1999 -41.92 -58.45 5.24 14.20 -6.98 2.43 1.63 
   1995-2000 -29.81 -47.47 14.42 1.53 -4.10 3.74 2.08 
   1996-2001 11.30 -16.80 13.73 3.14 1.59 4.32 5.32 
   1997-2002 27.11 -4.99 22.88 -1.97 4.25 1.21 5.73 
   1998-2003 52.56 15.74 26.51 -4.75 7.87 -1.30 8.48 
   1999-2004 69.83 31.64 33.03 -13.47 9.86 -1.06 9.84 
   2000-2005 93.63 54.25 22.29 -4.73 14.63 -1.27 8.47 
   2001-2006 134.15 95.48 19.60 -7.25 19.64 -2.04 8.72 
Note:  These are labor productivity growth decompositions weighted by base-year employment.  Labor productivity is 
the log of the ratio of real gross output divided by number of employees.  They apply Equation (4) in the text.  The exit 




itetet Pps 111 , so a positive exit term value means a positive contribution to productivity 
growth. 
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Appendix Table 5: Five-Year Multifactor Productivity Growth Decompositions 
 
 Total Within Between Cross Prop. Entry 
Disprop. 
Entry Exit 
United Kingdom        
   1982-1987 15.41 6.24 -0.52 7.83 2.27 -0.40* 
United States       
   1977-1982 2.43 -0.30 -1.26 3.52 0.19 0.24* 
   1982-1987 8.26 4.76 -1.39 3.92 0.69 0.27* 
Hungary        
   1986-1991 -23.12 -16.11 1.98 -1.67 -7.37 1.32 -1.28 
   1987-1992 -39.19 -29.05 0.77 7.38 -18.85 1.83 -1.27 
   1988-1993 -36.21 -28.60 0.22 12.31 -21.32 1.91 -0.73 
   1989-1994 -26.52 -28.15 -0.94 16.57 -16.80 0.64 2.16 
   1990-1995 1.03 -7.99 -2.06 8.92 1.25 -2.36 3.27 
   1991-1996 27.72 16.22 0.25 0.04 11.89 -3.92 3.24 
   1992-1997 33.54 22.01 2.19 -1.67 11.70 -4.58 3.89 
   1993-1998 31.47 23.56 2.95 -3.20 7.58 -2.64 3.23 
   1994-1999 14.35 10.00 5.45 -4.55 3.04 -2.07 2.49 
   1995-2000 14.05 10.28 6.28 -4.36 2.96 -2.71 1.61 
   1996-2001 19.04 13.76 5.93 -3.53 3.51 -2.18 1.54 
   1997-2002 17.82 11.95 4.43 -1.24 2.92 -1.16 0.91 
   1998-2003 20.84 15.67 5.49 -2.75 3.19 -0.81 0.05 
   1999-2004 21.88 19.14 4.07 -4.97 3.85 -0.36 0.15 
   2000-2005 24.76 20.78 6.06 -4.38 3.16 -2.07 1.20 
Lithuania        
   1995-2000 47.74 14.91 11.50 4.47 11.79 2.81 2.27 
   1996-2001 55.10 24.05 12.62 -1.83 13.54 3.47 3.25 
   1997-2002 45.23 25.22 11.71 -8.04 10.72 2.41 3.20 
   1998-2003 41.79 21.94 11.89 -7.43 10.72 1.35 3.32 
   1999-2004 49.10 27.31 13.67 -10.51 9.48 2.64 6.51 
   2000-2005 54.55 28.47 14.16 -10.01 11.13 2.58 8.21 
Romania        
   1992-1997 49.90 36.89 6.80 2.40 5.06 -0.83 -0.42 
   1993-1998 -0.08 -13.35 8.13 6.00 -1.25 0.60 -0.21 
   1994-1999 30.24 18.73 6.15 2.51 5.21 -2.44 0.07 
   1995-2000 24.83 12.20 10.92 -0.62 3.03 -0.67 -0.04 
   1996-2001 11.66 4.14 11.36 -2.44 1.72 -3.17 0.06 
   1997-2002 5.45 -6.71 11.44 3.09 0.03 -2.45 0.05 
   1998-2003 16.14 -1.29 11.28 3.98 2.79 -0.78 0.15 
   1999-2004 25.31 13.59 12.04 -2.40 3.03 -1.21 0.26 
   2000-2005 15.86 3.11 10.04 -1.38 1.70 -0.22 2.61 





 Total Within Between Cross Prop. Entry 
Disprop. 
Entry Exit 
Russia        
   1985-1990 13.60 14.58 0.69 -1.68 0.03 0.00 0.00 
   1986-1991 6.64 7.26 0.73 -1.62 0.13 0.15 0.00 
   1987-1992 -1.91 -3.38 1.63 0.75 -0.33 -0.57 0.00 
   1988-1993 -19.36 -22.59 1.18 4.71 -1.95 -0.71 0.00 
   1989-1994 -52.60 -57.02 1.98 10.19 -6.47 -1.38 0.10 
   1990-1995 -54.96 -62.26 2.11 14.09 -8.22 -1.01 0.32 
   1991-1996 -75.43 -83.49 3.11 10.83 -7.48 1.17 0.42 
   1992-1997 -47.05 -57.01 7.39 3.16 -2.98 1.22 1.18 
   1993-1998 -39.32 -49.27 8.25 2.33 -3.15 1.45 1.06 
   1994-1999 4.03 -9.32 8.23 0.14 0.26 1.90 2.83 
   1995-2000 17.90 3.79 7.95 -0.30 1.86 0.92 3.68 
   1996-2001 37.86 20.81 8.29 -4.01 5.75 1.20 5.82 
   1997-2002 28.12 10.69 8.77 -5.03 5.11 1.09 7.49 
   1998-2003 44.69 24.93 7.90 -4.58 6.63 1.57 8.24 
   1999-2004 38.26 15.05 9.74 -5.17 6.05 2.10 10.50 
Ukraine        
   1989-1994 -44.33 -47.51 1.42 2.76 -0.74 -0.24 -0.02 
   1992-1997 -94.95 -104.72 3.23 13.90 -8.61 1.04 0.21 
   1993-1998 -83.08 -97.16 4.73 16.04 -9.73 2.39 0.65 
   1994-1999 -42.65 -58.78 5.16 12.93 -6.94 3.56 1.41 
   1995-2000 -38.65 -55.56 9.95 6.49 -6.02 4.28 2.21 
   1996-2001 6.55 -23.08 14.17 4.98 1.02 4.42 5.04 
   1997-2002 22.31 -11.44 21.55 -0.09 3.53 3.12 5.64 
   1998-2003 46.35 10.44 23.84 -3.77 6.77 1.57 7.49 
   1999-2004 66.61 27.21 32.47 -11.53 8.30 1.31 8.85 
   2000-2005 89.73 50.11 22.45 -4.41 12.67 1.45 7.45 
   2001-2006 131.80 90.20 20.60 -7.23 18.73 1.82 7.69 
Note:  These are multifactor productivity growth decompositions weighted by base-year employment, with the 
exception of the U.S. numbers, which are weighted by base-year output.  The U.K. and U.S. numbers are our 
calculations based on Disney et al. (2003) and Haltiwanger (1997)’s results, respectively.  The U.K. and U.S. starred 
numbers are exit plus disproportionate entry. 
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Appendix Table 6: Entry Cohort Contributions  
to Three-Year Labor Productivity Growth 
 








(T-2) – T 
Entry 
Georgia      
   2000-2003 -0.93 -0.82 2.00 0.25 n.a. 
   2001-2004 -2.61 -0.78 0.46 -2.93 n.a. 
Hungary      
   1986-1989 0.03 0.19 -0.17 0.05 n.a. 
   1987-1990 -1.57 0.47 0.38 -0.71 n.a. 
   1988-1991 -2.51 1.24 0.84 -0.44 0.81 
   1989-1992 -3.81 1.50 3.19 0.88 4.76 
   1990-1993 -5.89 2.28 1.79 -1.82 4.30 
   1991-1994 -3.66 -2.13 0.63 -5.16 4.44 
   1992-1995 -2.59 -1.29 -1.73 -5.61 4.16 
   1993-1996 -1.75 -1.13 -1.21 -4.10 2.44 
   1994-1997 -1.63 -1.11 -0.19 -2.93 2.40 
   1995-1998 -1.40 -1.21 -0.95 -3.56 0.80 
   1996-1999 -1.39 -1.03 -0.73 -3.15 0.90 
   1997-2000 -1.55 -0.84 -1.09 -3.48 0.31 
   1998-2001 -1.78 -0.78 -0.43 -3.00 0.96 
   1999-2002 -1.43 -1.00 -0.38 -2.81 1.18 
   2000-2003 -1.68 -0.89 -0.73 -3.30 1.06 
   2001-2004 -3.46 -1.35 0.01 -4.80 1.44 
   2002-2005 -2.36 -2.88 -0.85 -6.09 0.83 
Lithuania      
   1995-1998 -1.40 -0.17 -0.73 -2.31 n.a. 
   1996-1999 -1.88 0.20 0.30 -1.38 n.a. 
   1997-2000 -1.70 -2.01 -0.46 -4.16 0.95 
   1998-2001 -1.93 -1.12 -1.52 -4.56 0.36 
   1999-2002 -2.12 -1.22 -1.02 -4.36 0.68 
   2000-2003 -2.49 -1.98 -0.99 -5.46 0.94 
   2001-2004 -0.92 -1.93 -1.42 -4.27 0.70 
   2002-2005 -1.70 -0.91 -1.37 -3.98 1.12 
Romania      
   1992-1995 -0.35 -0.14 0.42 -0.07 n.a. 
   1993-1996 -0.33 0.10 0.61 0.37 n.a. 
   1994-1997 -0.54 -0.45 0.42 -0.56 0.78 
   1995-1998 -0.71 0.09 -0.04 -0.65 0.29 
   1996-1999 -0.95 -0.21 -2.16 -3.32 -1.62 
   1997-2000 -0.90 -0.40 0.04 -1.26 0.74 
   1998-2001 -1.55 -0.82 0.18 -2.19 1.13 
   1999-2002 -1.63 -0.95 -0.31 -2.89 0.58 
   2000-2003 -1.45 -1.06 -0.37 -2.87 1.18 
   2001-2004 -1.95 -0.97 -0.52 -3.44 1.10 
   2002-2005 -2.11 -1.21 -0.82 -4.15 0.62 













(T-2) – T 
Entry 
Russia      
   1985-1988 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.04 n.a. 
   1986-1989 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 n.a. 
   1987-1990 -0.05 0.00 0.00 -0.05 0.00 
   1988-1991 -0.12 -0.01 -0.01 -0.14 0.00 
   1989-1992 -1.32 -0.86 -0.06 -2.24 -0.01 
   1990-1993 -0.65 -1.29 -1.01 -2.95 -0.88 
   1991-1994 -0.66 -0.51 -1.11 -2.29 0.20 
   1992-1995 -0.36 -0.52 -0.24 -1.12 0.41 
   1993-1996 -0.04 -0.20 -0.40 -0.64 0.27 
   1994-1997 -0.09 -0.20 0.04 -0.25 0.40 
   1995-1998 -0.29 -0.57 -0.14 -1.00 -0.10 
   1996-1999 -0.22 -0.86 -0.15 -1.23 -0.06 
   1997-2000 -0.68 -0.57 -0.69 -1.95 -0.40 
   1998-2001 -0.96 -0.98 -0.51 -2.45 -0.28 
   1999-2002 -1.14 -0.64 -0.75 -2.53 -0.07 
   2000-2003 -1.13 -0.82 0.01 -1.94 0.97 
   2001-2004 -0.91 -1.34 -0.33 -2.58 0.81 
Ukraine      
   1992-1995 -0.31 -0.05 0.04 -0.33 n.a. 
   1993-1996 -0.04 -0.50 -0.03 -0.57 n.a. 
   1994-1997 0.23 -0.11 -0.24 -0.11 0.08 
   1995-1998 -0.44 0.58 -0.03 0.11 0.01 
   1996-1999 0.61 0.43 1.38 2.42 1.15 
   1997-2000 -0.15 0.65 0.98 1.47 1.42 
   1998-2001 -0.52 -0.25 0.98 0.21 0.38 
   1999-2002 -1.24 0.08 -0.03 -1.19 0.12 
   2000-2003 -1.49 -0.87 -0.06 -2.42 0.46 
   2001-2004 -0.38 -0.70 -0.60 -1.68 0.64 
   2002-2005 -0.89 -0.14 -0.20 -1.23 1.30 
   2003-2006 -0.84 -0.65 -0.08 -1.57 0.31 
Note:  These are disproportionate entry terms from labor productivity growth decompositions weighted by base-
year employment, applying Equation (4) in the text.  (T-2) – T entry is the difference between the year T-2 
contributions and what they were two years earlier as year T contributions. 
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Appendix Table 7: Reallocation and Labor Productivity Descriptive Statistics 
 
 










Georgia     
   2000-2003 1.47 0.37 1.94 0.16 
   2001-2004 1.37 0.31 1.64 0.17 
Hungary     
   1986-1989 0.72 0.21 0.47 0.15 
   1987-1990 0.84 0.20 1.37 0.02 
   1988-1991 0.89 0.35 1.77 0.01 
   1989-1992 1.06 0.41 2.60 0.01 
   1990-1993 1.05 0.45 2.66 0.01 
   1991-1994 1.07 0.36 2.43 0.01 
   1992-1995 1.15 0.36 2.26 0.04 
   1993-1996 1.13 0.33 1.74 0.01 
   1994-1997 1.12 0.29 1.67 0.03 
   1995-1998 1.14 0.29 1.80 0.03 
   1996-1999 1.13 0.28 1.76 0.02 
   1997-2000 1.13 0.28 1.76 0.01 
   1998-2001 1.11 0.27 1.73 0.02 
   1999-2002 1.11 0.27 1.82 0.02 
   2000-2003 1.12 0.26 1.81 0.00 
   2001-2004 1.20 0.26 2.12 -0.01 
   2002-2005 1.19 0.25 2.11 0.00 
Lithuania     
   1995-1998 1.11 0.37 1.26 0.08 
   1996-1999 1.15 0.42 1.23 0.07 
   1997-2000 1.27 0.43 1.25 0.03 
   1998-2001 1.21 0.38 1.31 0.03 
   1999-2002 1.18 0.36 1.47 0.06 
   2000-2003 1.46 0.34 1.47 0.06 
   2001-2004 1.43 0.31 1.36 0.04 
   2002-2005 1.32 0.32 1.33 0.03 
Romania     
   1992-1995 1.23 0.50 1.95 0.07 
   1993-1996 1.28 0.48 2.22 0.06 
   1994-1997 1.23 0.44 1.34 0.04 
   1995-1998 1.21 0.43 2.15 0.05 
   1996-1999 1.19 0.39 1.88 0.03 
   1997-2000 1.22 0.39 2.11 0.04 
   1998-2001 1.20 0.39 1.76 0.04 
   1999-2002 1.22 0.38 1.66 0.04 
   2000-2003 1.22 0.38 1.81 0.03 
   2001-2004 1.30 0.36 1.94 0.04 
   2002-2005 1.27 0.35 1.95 0.05 
   2003-2006 1.30 0.35 1.90 0.05 
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Russia     
   1985-1988 0.66 0.08 0.28 0.01 
   1986-1989 0.65 0.09 0.34 0.03 
   1987-1990 0.65 0.11 0.35 0.04 
   1988-1991 0.62 0.18 0.40 0.00 
   1989-1992 0.73 0.36 0.69 -0.04 
   1990-1993 0.81 0.45 0.65 -0.04 
   1991-1994 0.92 0.50 0.69 -0.01 
   1992-1995 1.00 0.42 0.66 0.08 
   1993-1996 1.05 0.44 0.66 0.12 
   1994-1997 1.11 0.34 0.72 0.13 
   1995-1998 1.11 0.30 0.83 0.11 
   1996-1999 1.19 0.28 1.00 0.09 
   1997-2000 1.27 0.25 0.93 0.09 
   1998-2001 1.29 0.26 0.91 0.09 
   1999-2002 1.33 0.23 1.04 0.10 
   2000-2003 1.31 0.22 1.00 0.09 
   2001-2004 1.36 0.23 1.10 0.09 
Ukraine     
   1989-1992 0.51 0.37 0.44 0.03 
   1992-1995 0.80 0.43 0.37 0.09 
   1993-1996 0.93 0.42 0.48 0.09 
   1994-1997 1.15 0.37 0.64 0.06 
   1995-1998 1.38 0.35 0.98 0.08 
   1996-1999 1.50 0.31 0.86 0.08 
   1997-2000 1.56 0.38 1.11 0.11 
   1998-2001 1.57 0.40 1.51 0.11 
   1999-2002 1.73 0.26 1.44 0.13 
   2000-2003 1.72 0.27 1.43 0.09 
   2001-2004 1.69 0.24 1.31 0.08 
   2002-2005 1.68 0.23 1.34 0.08 
   2003-2006 1.65 0.36 1.37 0.07 
Note: Productivity dispersion is the standard deviation of labor productivity in the first year of the three-year period.  
Productivity rank change is 1 minus the correlation in labor productivity rankings in the first and last years of the 
three-year periods.  Employment share change is the standard deviation of employment share change in the three-
year period.  Employment share change-productivity correlation is the correlation between a firm’s deviation from 
average labor productivity in the sector and its employment share change.   
 
 
 
 
 
